--- title: A Russian Invasion of Latvia is a Terrifying Possibility. We Should Take it Seriously description: "Russia's plans for a Baltic invasion are a terrifying possibility that should not be taken lightly." url: https://staging.fronts.co/article/a-russian-invasion-of-latvia-is-a-terrifying-possibility-we-should-take-it-seriously.md canonical: https://staging.fronts.co/article/a-russian-invasion-of-latvia-is-a-terrifying-possibility-we-should-take-it-seriously/ datePublished: 2026-05-18T15:00:27.000Z dateModified: 2026-05-20T18:50:16.000Z author: - name: Illya Sekirin url: https://staging.fronts.co/authors/illya-sekirin/ publisher: Fronts type: NewsArticle language: en tokens: 3640 --- ![Map showing projected drone forces movement from the Leningrad Military District toward Latvia](https://media.staging.fronts.co/images/articles/a-russian-invasion-of-latvia-map.jpg) In the Schindler Museum in Krakow, there is a room that traces the mood in the city the day before the Nazi invasion. Given this was the 31st August, the room - aptly - has a sign to the effect of “the last day of summer”. ‘Summer’ in this sense meaning both the season, but also the comparatively carefree era before the war came. Today, it is my profound conviction that modern Europe is in its “last days of summer”. One that, if precautions are not taken now, may be followed by a catastrophe equal to that visited on Poland in 1939. The core difference being that instead of German tanks rolling east, it will be Russian drones flying west to spread terror in the Baltic States. The idea that a Russian invasion of the Baltic States could take place this year may strike some as unlikely, if not absurd. But in reality, it is based on sound military logic. Outflanking your enemy is the core principle of military operations: at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. At least since early 2024, when I started providing consistent advice to the Ukrainian High Command, including then Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine (now Minister of Defence) Mykhailo Fedorov and the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine Oleksander Pivnenko, among others, it has been the central tenet of operational strategy in Ukraine. When the Russians attempted to launch a “final” assault on the Donbas in 2024, we hit them in their underbelly at Kursk. When they tried to storm Kupiank in 2025, we hit their weak point, taking the key elevated terrain north of the city and blocking their supply (and retreat) routes. When they attempted to outflank Orikhiv on their way to Zaporizhzhia in 2026, we hit the overextended right flank of the Group of Forces “Vostok”, almost breaking through to encircle it around Huliaipole. There were countless other operations, of course, but my guiding principle has always been the same: find the weak spot in the enemy battle order and exploit it. If there is a flank, it should be turned. The Russians are good students. If we analyse their operations and tactics from 2024 to 2026, they have also shifted the planning and execution of their operations from simply massing resources on directions with easiest access to railway supply lines and population centres to trying to unexpectedly (at least in their opinion) change the axes of advance, always trying to catch the Ukrainians off guard by outflanking their positions. For example, once they were at the gates of Pokrovsk and Selydove, the Group of Forces “Centre,” turned southwards to roll up the Ukrainian front line around Kurakhove (and then Vuhledar), thus bypassing the reserves General Okeksander Syrsky sent to stop them. Equally, the Russians outflanked Vuhledar itself, followed by a similar move around Velyka Novosilka. The Kursk salient was also liquidated by a flanking attack, most importantly around Sverdlikovo, which allowed their concentrated elite drone units to cut the main supply road Sumy-Sudzha. However, the Ukrainians have largely been able to see through these maneuvers and position their own forces and reserves accordingly, at least to an extent to which the rigidity of static defence preferred by Syrsky and Zelensky allowed. Accordingly, the Russian tactical successes were never transformed into an operational breakthrough, despite the colossal resources they sacrificed for it, both in terms of manpower and drones (other forms of military equipment play a lesser role today, and should only be reviewed as auxiliary capabilities in modern war). As a result of this lack of operational success, now the Russians have come up with a new daring plan, which can best be described as Strategic Outflanking. Instead of battering the drone-saturated Ukrainian defences and trying to pierce our formidable kill zone, the Russians are now preparing for an invasion of the Baltics. As NATO is hopelessly behind Russian (and Ukrainian) drone and counter-drone capabilities, but with plans to learn from Ukraine and build up their own drone forces in 2027, Gerasimov believes his best chance against the states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will come this summer. In addition to NATO’s incomplete drone wall, the uncertain stance of President Trump removes many deterrents that prevented Russia from attacking NATO in the past. Some may argue that Russia will not want to open a second front while its armies are entangled in Ukraine. They say, if Russia was stopped by a third-class military (that is, presumably, Ukraine’s), how on earth could it try its luck against the mighty NATO? That argument would be valid if we were talking about a long, drawn-out campaign that could escalate to the nuclear level. But in terms of this plan, it completely misses the point. Russia may attack NATO’s eastern flank precisely because it is unexpected, making the success of a blitzkrieg campaign so much higher. Furthermore, the Drone Revolution we are witnessing in the Russia-Ukraine war now has profoundly changed the character of modern war and, consequently, the balance of power in Europe and the world at large. Essentially, countries with advanced drone forces (currently only Russia and Ukraine) have the competitive advantage over any other military to such a degree that fighting them is comparable to entering the Second World War without tanks. America and the West have traditionally relied on their advantages in air power and long-range precision strikes to conduct multi-domain operations. Air power, however, is of little to no use against an enemy armed with advanced drone forces – good luck identifying and destroying a hidden drone pilot operating his deadly machine(s) from a treeline dugout, window of an apartment building or a concealed bunker. And you cannot destroy what you cannot even see from conventional air assets or satellites. Accordingly, Russia will want to hit the Baltics as it views them as the underbelly of the Ukraine-West coalition. The plan will run as follows: Moscow will attempt to conduct its drone blitz within a matter of weeks, during which all three Baltics states and large parts of Poland will be overrun. Then Putin will issue an ultimatum to the EU: stop all aid to Ukraine or his drone armies will press on to capture all of Poland. Needless to say, the large Polish tank fleets will be obsolete against drones – their effect can be compared to 1939 Polish cavalry brigades (it had 11 of them) trying to stop the mass of German Panzer Divisions. Seeing hundreds of their tanks and other conventional equipment smashed to pieces within a week, and with Russia promising to retaliate massively against any nuclear intervention, the Kremlin’s assumption is that EU leaders will cave to Putin’s demands. Without financial and military aid, Ukraine’s forces will eventually buckle. And once Ukraine falls, there will be no other country with advanced drone forces to stop Russia from becoming the new master of Europe. In battlefield terms, this Strategic Outflanking will be pursued along with Operational and Tactical Outflanking. Russia will probably want to attack the weakest of the three Baltic militaries first, concentrating all of their drones against one opponent initially. Thus, it will probably be Latvia. Following some form of hybrid warfare, but trying to avoid any large buildup of conventional military equipment, which can be detected by satellites and other sensors, Russia will probably rely on another form of concentration almost invisible from space – that of drones. By secretly withdrawing from Ukraine most of its best drone and counter drone units, it will mass them on the elevated terrain at the junction of the Russian, Latvian and Estonian borders. At the same time, Putin will ask his old friend Belorussian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko to feign preparations for an attack against the most obvious objective – the Suwalki corridor between Lithuania and Poland – so that most of NATO’s attention will be directed there. Then, through a well-coordinated and concentrated drone attack, followed by land forces of the Leningrad Military District (which have been receiving combat experience as part of the Group of Forces “North” in Ukraine), Russia will hit at the junction of Latvian and Estonian brigades, quickly securing the high ground between the international border and Riga, and bringing up drone operators and EW assets as fast as they can. If they manage to capture these crucial heights within a few days, the fate of Riga will be sealed. After the fall of the Latvian capital, a Russian drone-centered maneuver force will be able to either swing north against Estonia and NATO troops stationed there or, more likely, hit the main Lithuanian, NATO and advancing Polish forces in the rear, positioned against the Belarusian border (Belarus, in fact, may well never enter the war at all and instead limit itself to hybrid actions and feigns). The crucial question now is how Europe can stop such a contingency from developing? First, we need to recognise that NATO will not be able to have strong drone forces by this summer capable of halting a Russian drone blitz. Accordingly, it should invite at least one or more Ukrainian drone brigades to take over the defences of the region and train and prepare local forces for drone warfare to be able to fight today or tomorrow. Of course, it will not be easy for President Zelensky to sell this move at home politically, but he must still do it. From a purely military point of view, the potential collapse of NATO threatens Ukraine’s future far more than creeping Russian advances in the Donbas. Besides, Russia will also want to move its drone forces to oppose the Ukrainians in the Baltic theater, so the effect on the war in Ukraine will be zero-sum. In fact, NATO’s eastern flank is Ukraine’s northern flank. Not covering it with Ukrainian drone forces would mean negligence. For Ukraine. And for NATO too. Secondly, NATO joint forces in the Baltics must take drones seriously. Ukrainian drone experts can help (that was the primary reason why I wrote my book “[Rise of the Machines](https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Machines-Russia-Ukraine-Operations-Strategy/dp/1804519707)”). The whole paradigm of warfare must shift – the drone is the new king of the battlefield and all other capabilities should support it. Accordingly, military doctrines, organisation, procurement, strategy, operational art concepts and tactics must all change. If NATO doesn’t want to learn from Ukraine, the Russians will teach them drone warfare, as we in turn taught the Russians before. But it will not be pretty. Those carefree summer days may not return to Europe for quite some time. _Illya Sekirin is the author of Rise of the Machines: Drone Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War – Tactics, Operations, Strategy (2026). In addition to advising several senior members of the Ukrainian High Command since early 2024, he has also worked as a researcher and translator for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He has also served as a front line drone operator in 2022 and 2023. Find Rise of the Machines on Amazon, here: [https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Machines-Russia-Ukraine-Operations-Strategy/dp/1804519707](https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Machines-Russia-Ukraine-Operations-Strategy/dp/1804519707)_ <!-- generated-faq --> ## FAQ ### Why does the author believe Russia might invade Latvia this summer? The author argues that Russia is preparing a “Strategic Outflanking” to bypass Ukrainian defenses and strike NATO’s underbelly while it remains vulnerable. General Gerasimov reportedly believes this summer offers the best chance because NATO is still behind in drone capabilities and President Trump’s uncertain stance removes past deterrents. A rapid drone blitz could overrun the Baltic States before NATO builds up its own drone forces in 2027. ### What is the author's proposed Russian attack plan against Latvia? Russia would likely concentrate its best drone and counter-drone units on elevated terrain at the junction of the Russian, Latvian, and Estonian borders while avoiding detectable conventional buildup. Following hybrid warfare preparations, it would launch a concentrated drone attack, followed by land forces from the Leningrad Military District, to secure high ground between the border and Riga. Capturing these heights within days would seal the fate of the Latvian capital and allow forces to swing against Estonia or hit Lithuanian and Polish troops in the rear. ### How does the author say Belarus would be used in a Baltic invasion? The author suggests Putin would ask Aleksandr Lukashenko to feign preparations for an attack against the Suwalki corridor between Lithuania and Poland. This diversion would direct most of NATO’s attention away from Latvia, allowing Russia to strike unexpectedly at the Latvian-Estonian junction. Belarus itself might limit its role to hybrid actions and feints without formally entering the war. ### Why does the author argue that NATO air power would be ineffective against Russian drones? The author contends that advanced drone forces render traditional air power largely useless because drone pilots operate from hidden locations like treelines, apartment windows, or concealed bunkers. These operators cannot be identified or destroyed from conventional air assets or satellites, making multi-domain operations dependent on air and long-range precision strikes obsolete against such an enemy. ### What recommendation does the author make for defending NATO's eastern flank? The author urges NATO to invite at least one or more Ukrainian drone brigades to take over regional defenses and train local forces for drone warfare, since NATO cannot field capable drone forces by this summer. He argues that NATO’s eastern flank is Ukraine’s northern flank, and failing to cover it with Ukrainian drone units would constitute negligence for both parties. ### How does the author compare today's Europe to 1939 Poland? He likens modern Europe to the mood in Krakow on August 31, 1939, described at the Schindler Museum as the “last day of summer” before the Nazi invasion. He warns that without precautions, Russian drones flying west could bring a catastrophe equal to that visited on Poland when German tanks rolled east. <!-- /generated-faq -->