--- title: "Due South Episode 3: Mayhem in Mali (w/ Casus Belli)" description: Coordinated terror attacks in Mali have exposed the dire security situation in the Sahel region and West Africa. url: https://staging.fronts.co/podcast/due-south-episode-3-mayhem-in-mali.md canonical: https://staging.fronts.co/podcast/due-south-episode-3-mayhem-in-mali/ datePublished: 2026-05-09T14:00:10.000Z dateModified: 2026-05-22T12:04:57.000Z author: - name: Wilfred Waimiri url: https://staging.fronts.co/authors/wilfred-m-waimiri/ publisher: Fronts type: NewsArticle language: en audio: https://media.staging.fronts.co/audio/due-south-episode-3-mayhem-in-mali.mp3 tokens: 15028 --- ladies and gentlemen good morning good evening good afternoon whenever and wherever you're listening to us from this is the div south podcast with me your host wilfred minor i am the africa correspondent for france.co and today i am joined by french west africa analyst casus belli we're going to be discussing basically the biggest story that has happened in the global south in the past week the coordinated terror attacks that happened in mali where jihadist group jamak nusrat al-islam wal muslimin and really known by the acronym janim together with tuareg separatist group azawad liberation front which we will abrigate with the initialism fla attacked large swaths of mali including the capital bamako and they killed the nation's defense minister among many other casualties and it has exposed just how dire the security situation is within the sahel region and the wider west africa as a whole but also just how big of an issue is facing west africa in terms of just the security crisis and of course there's also the question of where were the russians well while these attacks were happening last week we published a video on war fronts which you should definitely check out the failure of russia's africa call in africa cold spell disaster for sorry the failure of russia's africa call in mali rather cold spell disaster for russia's wider ambitions in the region and to discuss that as i mentioned we have casus belli who is a wonderful french analyst and a good friend of this show casus welcome we are really happy to have you here hello thank you for inviting me i'm pretty excited to discuss this mali topic which is very complex but yeah i'm very glad to be here with you thanks casus please introduce yourself and tell us what's been happening in mali give us as much of an overview as possible so that our audience are up to speed with where you and i are right now so to introduce myself in a few words not going too long on that but i've been pretty much doing osint which is open source intelligence analysis on different regions i mainly started with x ussr so i was you mostly focused on Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and so many other different regions. And I started like five or six years ago, and I noticed how Russia was really interested and active in Africa, actually. And in the meantime, I realized lots of people, like there were not a lot of people actually keeping an eye on what was happening in Africa. So I said, okay, there's enough people working on the Middle East, on Russia, and so on. So I want to actually keep an eye on Africa and Russian activities in Africa. So this is how it all started. So I kept working for years on what was happening in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and also other countries like Guinea, Conakry, Ivory Coast, and so on. So basically more like Sahel and West Africa. So what can I say about Mali, actually? So it started on 25 April early in the morning, like 5 a.m. local time. And we got a lot of different reports on terrorist attacks in the capital in Bamako with a vehicle which was directly sent into the Mali defense minister, Sadio Kamara, in his residency. And this vehicle was likely full of explosives, and it basically destroyed his residency, killing him and his wife and kids. And at the same time, we got lots of different reports on multiple positions of Malin army being attacked all over the country, but also in the capital in Bamako and the Indo-Soburn, like Katy. So it was very confusing at the first hour, during the very first hour, the very first days actual of the attacks. But it seems like it was a very coordinated and complex attack led by Janim, which is basically Al-Qaeda. And at the same time, the FLA, which is the Front of Liberation of Ezzawad, which is both of them are basically two Arabs, but they don't have the exact same ideology. One of it is more likely affiliated to terrorist groups, or Al-Qaeda basically, but the other one is more linked to, how can I say that, like old independent movements, which started years ago actually in the north of Mali, and which is actually a huge problem for Mali for decades now. So basically that's true. So basically that's true. Group teamed up and attacked different positions. They attacked Kidal, they attacked Tessalids, they attacked Bamako, they attacked so many different cities at the same time. And they took by surprise different positions, forcing actually Russians, which are very present, by the way, in Mali. Since like 2021, they are like up to 2,000 or 3,000, something between that. Soldiers in the country. They came up after the end of Barkhanov's operation, when France left basically Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger. And Russia offered its services for the new power. As I remember, the actual leader of the Mali is Asimigoita, which is a military officer, which took power in 2021. So he basically took power, and then Russia immediately offered their assistance to the country to projects of forces. And back then, there were also still the Wagner Group. I think everyone pretty much know what is Wagner Group, which is a Russian mercenary group led by Prigozhin. And he died, unfortunately, in 2023, leaving behind him a wall system with different troops and soldiers and companies, and very complex, actually, system behind him. And this system was taken over by the Russian Ministry of Defense, and now it is called Africa Corp. And why am I saying that? I'm saying that, actually, because Wagner was used by Russia as a tool for what we call plausible deniability. So the capacity of a state to use, actually, mercenaries, but actually not be accused of anything, since, you know, it's mercenaries, so it's a private company. And private companies can work by themselves and not link it to the government. So this is how Russians were using Wagner, but when Prigozhin died, there was a wish inside the Kremlin to centralize and have the full control of the Wagner Group and all the companies they were having around that. So this is why Russia created Africa Corp, but this is kind of similar dynamic. Plus, they added more equipment to Mali for their forces, they sent more people, and, yeah, this is pretty much how it went. And I'm saying all of that to just give a great overview on what is actually the dynamic in Mali. So, to put it some... Put it shorter, you have a new military leader which took power in 2021, which is Asini Goita. He had his Malian defense minister, which has been killed on 25 April by a terrorist attack in Bamako. On the international level, you got Russia, which has sent previously by NURB and now Africa Corp in Mali since like 2021, 2022, basically. And now these units have been attacked by two groups, which is FLA and Al-Qaeda. It's actually JANIM, but they are affiliated with Al-Qaeda. So these two groups started to attack on the north. They attacked different positions and even forced Russians to retreat and leave their position, sometimes leaving Malian forces behind them and just dealing with the terrorist groups and FLA to agree with them that they are not going to attack them, but they can retreat. And yeah, this is pretty much a quick overview I can give you in some minute, but it's obviously way more complex than that. And I will be more than glad to go in detail with you. Yes, as you said at Casas, it's a very complex situation. It's something that is evolving even as we speak right now. The attacks have not stopped. JANIM, the Front for the Liberation of Azawad, FLA, they're still fighting the Malian government. And even before we go too deep into this, I want to point out that while these two are the main groups involved in these attacks, they're not the only ones that have been attacking Malian positions, Malian government positions rather, and they're not the only armed group that is active within the country. There's also the Islamic State Sahel province, which for the longest time has been a very big competitor of JANIM, to the point where we're seeing defections between the two groups. Most recently in February, when a commander of JANIM called Saad, or Sadu, as some people call him, defected from JANIM, accusing the organization of not carrying out, not executing the tenets of Islam the way he would like to see it, the way it is prescribed, you're within the tenets of Jihad, instead choosing to defect to the Islamic State. Qasas, could you talk us through what you've seen about the Islamic State taking advantage of these attacks and using them as cover to launch their own attacks? How far has this... Islamic State come since the beginning of these attacks on the 25th? So, from what I have seen, and I just want to put a disclaimer here, I'm not an anti-terrorist expert. My main topic is mostly Russian activities in Africa. On 25th April, FLA and Janim attacked different Malin Russian positions, and for three days or four days, I'd say, the Islamic State was pretty much silent, like they were not moving even, like, four different analysts I had, which are more experts on anti-terrorism in general, they noticed how strange it was because the Islamic State was pretty much out of the game in these attacks, which means they were not aware of what was going on, and they were not in the loop of these attacks, but on the fourth day, while FLA and Janim were progressing on the ground and taking different cities, they took Kidal, for example, but while they were progressing and heading towards the city of Meneka, especially, which is very close to the, what we call the, I don't know exactly in English, but it's like the border with Burkina Faso and Niger, this is a very dangerous area because there's three borders, and this is where Islamic State actually goes, and we have seen that the Islamic State was actually trying to take advantage of this situation, they tried to attack Meneka, for example, like, if our audience just take a time to look on the map, you will see how close it is to the triple border, and they tried to take advantage because the FLA and Janim was attacking the city at the same time, so they tried to surround and take advantage from this mess ongoing and the fighting between Russians, Malians, and the terrorists, and FLA at the same time, and tried to force their entry in the city, but unfortunately for them, they were repelled, I mean, the Malians and Russians hold pretty good to put their positions, and they had air support, so they pretty much repelled the attacks from both, I'm actually from FLA, from Janim, and from Islamic State, so... They are, from what I know, but I'm not exactly up to date, but from what I know, they are still holding their position. And they mostly secured the airport, which is the key infrastructure you want to secure in the city. So, yeah, this is pretty much what I have seen on Islamistan. All right. So we have three terrorist groups attacking one country at the moment. We have the FLA, the Islamic State Sahel province, and Janim. And again, just to emphasize for our audience, Janim and FLA are the ones that are working together. The Islamic State is opportunistically taking advantage of what is happening to try and show up their own positions and gain a stronger foothold. Just generally speaking, improve their fortunes, so to say. So let's go, Cassus, to what allowed these attacks to happen. Because one thing that keeps coming back to my mind, for our listeners, for anyone who's new, I am based in Kenya. And Kenya, we've been the victim of multiple terror attacks, including one where a group of believed Al-Shabaab militias attacked a restaurant called Ducydito in one of the most upmarket areas in Nairobi. So whenever I'm thinking of a terrorist attack, I'm thinking, what intelligence failures allowed these terrorists to gain enough strength and, you know, enough confidence and basically enough positioning to launch these attacks? Because again, these were heavily coordinated attacks in Mali. These were not just singular attacks like in Kenya, where just one restaurant was targeted. This was a coordinated attack across hundreds of kilometers. As we've been saying on war fronts recently, Mali is about two times the size of France and five times the size of the UK. Just to give you an idea of how grand the country is. So what intelligence failures led to that? How badly has the government lost control of areas, particularly in the north, where we are having expert analysis say, you know, they've left, they've actually left a security vacuum that Janim is seeking to fill. So how badly has the government failed in allowing this to happen? Actually, this is a great question. And there's many things to say here. I'm going to start with actually, whether you pointed out correctly, which is the geography. Mouser Mali has been a problem for Benako for decades, like even when... barca and like french operation were ongoing in mali back then it always has been a difficult region for multiple reasons but it's as big as eastern europe basically if you try to put it in a map it's as big as eastern europe and back then france has like 10 000 troops on the ground trying to make to secure and make safer the northern parts and we actually failed because we could never stop this group from progressing or they will just play with borders and jump here and there remember mali is actually sharing a massive border with algeria and both countries have like mali has often been accusing algeria to support or let to leave these groups in his own territory so this is a huge yeah this is really massive and people don't realize how big is this region and how difficult is it even for troops to progress on the ground if you're not native or family or with the desert it's not only sand it's always very with a lot of rocks and difficult roads actually to progress on the ground so yeah so you have this first factor which is the region being so actually big in the north then you have the dissension because two years ago there was an accord between mali and these groups in the north and algeria was a facilitator in these talks to make an agreement and be more inclusive toward the northern population in the actual bamako government and after the coup in 2021 this accord have been stopped at all so obviously bamako just basically how do you say that just stopped at all this agreement with the northern part so though there's that of course france leaving like france when it was present was providing a lot of intelligence because we were deploying ice airplanes drones satellite imagery so many tools actually used by intelligence agencies to gather intelligence and keep an eye on the various groups actually in the country but when france left and i think the same dynamic happened in when the u.s and france left there was a vacuum of intelligence gathering and tools to gather intelligence and this is why the new Malian government which took power in 2021 was kind of forced somehow to find another partner to rely on to have some intelligence providing its troops actually and this is probably why they try to get closer to Russia but also to Turkey and I will maybe maybe talk about this later so basically they just shifted from a partner to another one and the thing is Russia is already involved in Ukraine as everyone knows and is already deploying a lot like a lot of its intelligence capabilities in Ukraine to ensure its war and so on so what they deployed actually in Mali was probably not announced I know they deployed electronic warfare but it was more to block the drone attacks and so on but they don't really have the same ISR capabilities that France or the US had they don't exactly have the same instrument to collect data and especially they are more focused on Ukrainian warfare which is an army against another army now in Mali you're facing terrorist groups so you gotta have different techniques for intelligence and this is absolutely not the same methods and this could be one of the reason to why there was such a huge security breach and the third reason is that a few days like maybe a week before the attacks they were actually reports like there's a journalist which is called which is called Serge Daniel on Twitter. He is very well informed and he published that the Malin government was actually aware that there will be a huge a huge security breach in the near future we didn't know exactly when but there was an obvious threat about this and if you look in the news it's kind of funny to notize that Nigeria for example was already sending sending more troops to its own airports to make to make the infrastructure safer and a few other countries in the region did the same and why the re the reason behind this is that there were multiple attacks but one of the most spectacular over the last months was in i think january or february the attacks so on a Niamese airport in Niger, where I think it was the Islamic State in this case, but they breached the security, they attacked the airport, and you even have different videos of them driving all along the airport near the planes. They shot different positions, they destroyed different aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. So there's definitely a huge risk with the terrorist group breaching your security and reaching directly to the airport. And I think the Malians inside the government, the intelligence, was aware of this problem, but for some reason, which is not really clear until today, they did not really act in the correct way to make the disposal safer and enter the security of the airport. because during the 25th attack, they also tried to attack the airport. So they didn't really breach the security airport, but they attacked different locations at the same time. So maybe there was kind of a mis-evaluation of the threat on the capital and also the fact that they will be making an alliance with FLA and Al-Qaeda in the north. So yeah, there's definitely some failure in that counter-terrorism work. And I think until today, we don't really know, but we can have a hint based on different small signals and the context of these attacks and also the fact that Russia is busy somewhere else. the fact that there were lots of information gathered by Malian intelligence, but for some reason not used by the government to ensure the safety. So I don't have an answer for that exactly. I just have some hints and some small signal, actually, if you look at the news before the attacks. So it just gives you an idea, but I don't really have the answer to your question. Kassas, you might not have a singular answer for my question, but in listing those reasons, in listing those disparate factors that led to the attack, you have provided enough of an idea for our audience to be able to gauge for themselves why this terror attack happened. Because one thing I really want to stress is that this, again, was just a really, really massive terror attack. And if, as you've just suggested, the government had information prior to the attack that the attack was going to happen. Again, it's a failing on the part of the government to allow such a massive terror attack to happen. And to corroborate your point on the government having information about this attack, when Russian troops left their positions in Mali, there were claims by several within the Malian establishment that the Russians had been negotiating this sort of withdrawal with Janim and the FLA for a while because it seemed planned. It did not seem to be just a haphazard withdrawal, just a haphazard kind of treaty that was signed with these groups to allow them to pass. So I want to go back to something we haven't really talked about when you were talking about the reasons why Janim and the FLA were able to launch such a major attack. The financial aspect. So a little while ago, this was several months ago, I can't remember the exact month, there were reports that Janim received a $50 million ransom from the UAE for several hostages that the group had kidnapped. And this included someone who was believed to be a very high-ranking member of an Emirati royal family who was involved in the gold trade in Mali. And according to Insight Threat Intelligence, this isn't the first time that Janim is receiving such vast sums of money. In 2020, it secured around $40 million in ransom for one French and two Italian hostages. And the group, the Insight Monitor group, estimates, and this is, again, a very rough estimate, that Janim generates about $100 million per year in revenue. So, again, we need to insist, that's a very, very rough estimate. But still, those are very big numbers. So, Kassos, how do you see such kind of financing helping the group to be able to launch such terror attacks? Thank you for bringing this topic, actually. It's a very, the thing which is very discussed online, like how do these groups get money? How do they finance themselves? So, there's many things, actually, and I think it's quite important to keep it in mind. So, first, there's groups, even the terrorist groups, Islamic groups, and so on. Even in Syria and in Iraq back then, when the Islamic State started their activities, they were just a group of bandits. So, the dynamic before being Islamist or anything with ideology is just... them being bandits so the dynamic of bandits is mostly making illegal trades smuggling weapons but smuggling also cigarettes smuggling drugs smuggling whatever they can smuggle to make some money so this is the logic behind it they don't have anything like how do we say that like a business or something they just basically trade what they can trade and get money out of it sometimes they will kidnap people local people to get money out fits or they will especially in northern valley they will make some raids on some villages that are working on gold mines and have their hands on the gold maybe they also sell vehicles they try to smuggle whatever they can to fund their activities so that's the first answer the second answer is that as you pointed out test groups tend to start campaign kidnapping campaigns especially targeting western or at least non-malians or non-africans citizens to because they know their government will deploy efforts to keep bring them back and when you do that as a country there's a point a moment when you will start having discussion with these terrorist groups and they will give you a price to free them and either you free them or you will abandon them but in general most of the countries will find a way to free them whether it's by deploying spiritual forces or paying actually these groups it doesn't mean actually these groups are founded by another state but they in order to free their own citizens they will pay whatever they have to pay to make their citizens free because it's not acceptable for a country to have your citizens kidnapped by terrorist groups and especially in the west western country because the dine also the dynamic is in western countries is like imagine you're an american citizen or a french citizen or german or whatever if you are kidnapped you will have all your family in your home country which will start pressuring the government to do something to free you actually and the way to free you is often to pay or give whatever they can give to free you so this is how actually the things happen but even it also work It's not like only international dynamic. It also works on a local scale. For example, let's say Al-Qaeda kidnap or make hostage Malian troops. If they keep them as hostage and they are like, I don't know, 100 or 200 prisoners, the Malian government will have at some point to either abandon them or they will have to pay to free them. And this group, remember, they're not in a fixed position, just like you will say an army in Ukraine, in Russia. When they have hostage, they just keep them in a jail and this jail doesn't move. These groups are actually nomads, so they basically move and they move their prisoner with them in the desert. So it's very difficult actually to catch them back. So this is pretty much how, in my opinion, these groups get founded. And then, of course, when they make such attacks as what they did on 25th April, they get their hands on military equipment, missiles, rockets, guns, oil as well. Remember, there's an oil crisis due to what's happening in Iran. And oil costs a lot now. They also have their hands on cash. Like in these attacks, we have seen groups showing. They found like 600k euro on a military basis. They found the electronic system of drones. They found S8 missiles and rockets in Kidel. They found BTR. They found MRAPs. So all these vehicles, whatever happens to them, they will be sold somehow to the black market if not used by the terrorist groups themselves. Well, remember, the terrorist groups, especially in general, don't have specialists. But they will be more than glad to disassemble these vehicles or directly sell them to whoever is ready to pay. So this is also one of the reasons why they get the money. And this is how actually they act. That's a really good overview of just how complex the financing network of terror groups like Janim, for example, are. And I don't want us to get too bogged down in how terror groups finance themselves because, again, that is an extremely complex topic that in and of itself deserves an entire podcast episode. So let's move on to something else. Kassos, you just mentioned something extremely interesting to me. The... price of oil is extremely high right now. And again, it's not just oil, it's fuel in general. And it's not just, you know, in Mali, it's all over the U.S. It's all over the world. If you go to a fuel pump right now, the prices are much higher than they were about three months ago. And again, we all know this is because of the war in Iran, the closure of the Strait of Wormuz. But for the Malian people, specifically those who are living in the capital, Bamako, they've had to deal with extremely high fuel prices and fuel shortages because of a blockade that Janine had placed on the capital city, Bamako, that began in September, seemed to ease off in January this year. So, Karsas, let's talk about the blockade that Janine had put on Bamako and whether it was a sign of worse things to come from Janine. And why, if you have any insights, why did the blockade seem to ease off in January? So, on this topic of Bamako's blockade, it indeed started around September when Janine just announced that they will block any truck coming to Bamako and try to refuel the city. So, basically what they did is just waiting on the roads leading to the capital and either attacking or forcing the trucks to leave, to go back from where they went. And they did that in order to put pressure on, political pressure on the government. Because, I mean, if the North is attacked and different positions are lost, I mean, Mali can still survive, and it already did in the past. They don't necessarily need to have the full control on the North to keep running the country. I mean, Bamako is southwest, so it's very down in the south in the country. And again, Mali is so fucking big that they don't necessarily have to control this northern part with terrorists and independent groups and so on. So, what was the strategy adopted by Janine is to declare a blockade in September around Bamako and blocking the trucks. It was a blockade on oil only first. Why oil? Because it's used for daily usage. It's used by transport. It's used by taxis. It's used to... get water to get electricity to get anything basically the whole life in bamako is on oil so they tried to start this blockade and it was only focused on oil and it lasted until december in january it kind of i think i don't think it stopped to be honest i think it was just they were actually trying to see what will go on in the middle east probably and i think at the same time they were not like they were not in able to keep the same positions to block the trucks in around bamako because if i'm correct the malian government to deploy started to deploy more security forces to ensure this these roads were free in december last year they had a shortage actually of oil which triggered lots of protests in bamako i mean not protests but just lots of people gathering to try to get oil from oil station in the capital and it created a lot of frustration and i think the government in bamako knew that it is a risk actually for them because people would accept a lot of things as long as you provide them the security and you let them live their lives and work basically but if they are private from working for from moving and at some point from getting food you will start to have a lot of struggles so this is why they started some different operation to free the roads around bamako i remember there was videos from russians as well deployed alongside malians with helicopters flying over the roads remember bamako is only connected to other countries like senegal guinea and a few other countries by if i'm correct there is only like four or five major roads so if you block these roads basically you can strangle capital but i yeah they deployed a lot of forces and i know what we see and what's different with the to all block it is that they decided like joshnim announced that they will block everything not only oil but every good every food whatever they can block they will block it and again this is not a static situation it's not a regular army so they act like bandits they will wait on the road attack the trucks eventually ask people to leave or the trucks to go back to their countries and that's it but sometimes they can leave the road and some trucks will reach Bamako anyway. So yeah, this is not a binary science like either I block you or I don't block you. It's way more complex than that on the field. And this is pretty much what they tried to put in Bamako. I think it was five or four days after the attack on 25th April. And the logic stayed the same behind it. The logic is to put political and social pressure on the government to force them to actually open talks with these groups and find a way to deal something. Remember, there were lots of talk in Malia at some point to eventually find someone that will be able to open the channels with those groups and talk with them. But the Malian government simply doesn't want to talk at all with them. They consider them as terrorist groups. They don't want to have anything to do with them. So they will keep fighting against them. And yeah, that's pretty much what I can say. All right. And yeah, that gives me a lot of good information that I did not have about just how complicated a blockade can be when it's being imposed by a terror group that does not adhere to the same rules of combat that a conventional military would adhere to. Because if we're thinking of a blockade, we'd often think about something similar to what the U.S. is doing in Iran by blockading its ports. It's something very well organized. It's something that has been declared. It's something, you know, it isn't banditry dressed up as a blockade. But as you've mentioned, these groups are fundamentally bandits. So thank you for that training. So let's move away from Janim for a moment and talk about the partners in this group, the Kuareg Militia, the FLA. So one thing, and I'm not as well-versed in what's happening in Mali as you are, but one thing that I really want the people listening to this podcast to understand is the issues that are happening in Mali are not just something that sprung up at once and, you know, appeared out of nowhere. For a long time, the Tuaregs in the north of Mali had been engaged in what was by then called the Mali War against the Malian state. And that came to an end after the signing of the 2015 Algiers Accord, which, as the name suggests, was signed. in the little city of Algeria, basically bringing this conflict to an end. But once the military junta came to power, they tore up the Algerian Accord, basically guaranteeing that this conflict will rise up again. And I don't know if it was a direct cause of it, but in some ways ensuring that we'd see a situation where the Janim and the Tuareg militias meet up because they have a common enemy. So another thing I want to emphasize for our audience is that the leader of Janim, a gentleman by the name of Iyad al-Ghali, is himself a Tuareg from the Ifogas clan, which is often described as part of the aristocracy within the Tuareg ethnic hierarchy. And as Kassas has noted, although these troops don't have much in common, they don't have common ideologies, just the simple fact that Janim's key leader, the most forward-facing person, the voice behind the movement, is that Tuareg is in and of itself a link. So Kassas, I'll pass it back to you to discuss the ties between Janim and the FLA and what led to us seeing these two groups coming together. And finally, whether the Islamic State Sahel can actually join this little band of merry men that they've formed for themselves. Okay, what can I say about this is that first you need to understand the logic behind this ethnic group because before being Janim or FLA or whatever, they are tribes, they are ethnic groups in the north, and it happens that they are mostly Tuaregs. Tuaregs are nomads, of course, and they are living in the desert. So the logic behind that is that there are different tribes among them, and their logic is to survive and make survive their tribe especially. They don't really care. I mean, they do care about other tribes, but their tribe is the key group they have to make survive first. So the dynamic among Tuaregs is pretty much that. And when it comes to the FLA or the JNIM, the thing is whether... There you have the key leader hating more, like, I mean, the dynamic between those two groups is kind of different because some of them are more Islamist in their core and some of them are more anti-Islamist but more independentist in their core. And, of course, all these tribes which compose Al-Qaeda, I mean, Janim and FLA are similar, they know each other, they talk to each other, but there is always some distance. It's not like people have some kind of cliche in their mind, like, okay, they all talk together, they work together, they eat together, and they love each other, which is not true, actually, because there is still some distance between them. One of the interesting things to note is if you pay attention, to the videos released by Janim and FLA, especially the drone ones, you will notice that Janim barely used Kamikay's FPV drone while FLA widely use it, which gives you a hint, actually, on the dynamic between the two groups and the fact that they don't share everything in common, which is logic, because today they work together because they made an alliance against the Mayan government, and they work together in that nature. But I think both groups know that in the future they might be enemies again and fight against each other because it was the case in the past. So this gives you a hint on how different these groups can be. This is a very complex dynamic between these two, and as you pointed out, the Alger Accords were more inclusive. This is pretty much what I was telling at the beginning of the podcast. There was an Alger Accord between Bamako and Independent East and New North, like FLM, basically, and they were including them in the government. But when the coup happened in 2021, the Azawa leaders, like Tuareg leaders, in Bamako left the capital, and basically the Accords were stopped. So they were ended. So this is when the mess kind of restarted again, because these people went back to their position in the north, they regrouped, and they wanted to attack again in Bamako. And I think they found an opportunity to deal with Jhinim. I remember that Jhinim was actually... and attacking as a war time to time when they were crossing their path in the desert they are also attacking fighting with islamic state when they cross them in the desert so it's not really binary relation like whether i like you or i don't like you sometimes they work together sometimes they fight together but the core dynamic is that currently they found a common ground to agree on something between fla and jnim and now it seems like islamic state is out of the loop i don't think so they will join such coalition work together because their view i mean if you want to form an island you have to share some common ground with your partners and i think islamic state is way too far from that from fla and jnim of at this moment to work on anything together so and even they don't want it personally i think they don't really have any interest in doing that right now in terms of from their own point of view in my opinion they have more benefits on just waiting and watching what will happen watching them both sides like valians russians flh name it we're just watching them fighting and losing troops losing equipment and just waiting to see how it goes before joining the again the battle and maybe take over the advantage but for now i don't think they will like any they will join any islands in the near future all right thanks casas now i do want to add one thing that i got from an another regional expert wasim nasir who's a researcher at the supan center who specializes in jihadist movements so the two groups apparently formed an alliance in 2025 and under that agreement the fna accepts the application of sharia law in territories that they jointly control with janim and military expertise as you just mentioned is shared between the two sides and if towns are captured urban centers are ruled by the fla while rural areas are managed by janim just you know a brief piece just to add some color to what you just mentioned so next i want us to discuss russia's africa core and the role that they played in keeping mali safe since the junta kicked out the french and you know embraced embraced the russians basically and you know we i know we've touched on this a little casas i just want us to go a little bit more in depth and discuss whether these russian feelings and in particular whether the feeling feeling feeling So I want to give a little bit of color before I finish that statement. After the terror attacks that happened on the 25th, one Malian commander told the press that the Russians had abandoned them. And as you've rightly pointed out, Cassis, there were instances where Malian troops were left by Russian forces. Basically, the Russians gained safe passage, got agreements with Ada Janimo, the FLA, that they wouldn't be attacked. And they left, leaving the Malian troops to their own devices, basically the Russians saying, hey, bro, we're sorry, you're on your own. So what do you think of that? What do you think that kind of abandonment, that kind of betrayal will have on Mali's ability to trust the word of the Russians? And are we looking at a situation where the Russians could be replaced as the main security guarantor of not just Mali, but other Sahelian states, specifically in the coup belt that kicked out the French and embraced the Russians with open arms? So, yeah, this is more an expertized land of mine. So I will start with actually what was Wagner Group. And one of their major progress, I mean, this is how they presented it. They presented it back then in 2022 or 2023. It was the capture of Gao, which is a key strategic city in the desert in Mali. And it was presented like a huge success for Russia, for Wagner, especially for Wagner, actually. And after that, the Wagner Group suffered one of its biggest attacks in Tindzawatan because they went too far in the north, in a city called Tindzawatan, very close to Algerian border. And they got surrounded. It was like a colon of Russian forces, I mean, Wagner forces in the north. And they got surrounded and smashed and killed. I think it was one of their biggest losses since the Russians went to Mali. And they were mercenaries. So there's not the same dynamic when it's mercenaries dying or when it's actually Russian troops. So this was the main event in 2023. After that and after the change of the structure of Binary into Africa Corp. So there was a mistake. And this new Russian expeditionary forces in Sahel, in Mali especially, was supervised by the Minister of Defense, by Andrei Averinov, which is one of the leaders of the GRU, which is basically the Russian military intelligence. And he is the commander of the African Corps for Africa. So for Sahel region. And what they did is they kind of sent like for 2025 alone, they sent like five ships to Guinea-Conakry. And these ships were carrying lots of Russian equipments, including electronic warfare, tanks, artillery weapons, ammo, a lot of ammo, MRAPs, Batier, and so many armored vehicles that were shipped to Conakry. And from Conakry, it was heading by road until Red Shinba Macro and delivering, supplying actually, Africa Corps, and reinforcing with them with armored vehicles in the desert. So the whole 2025 was dedicated to this effort for Russia. And they reinforced some of their positions around Bamako, especially because one of the, besides the terrorist threat on Bamako, one of the other threats that people tend to forget sometimes is that you're never safe from another officer among Malian army being too frustrated and starting his own coup. So in order to avoid that, you don't necessarily want to have Malian officers around you because one of them can betray you, but you can have Russian forces around you or Turkish forces around you so they ensure your own security and stability and ensure you stay in power. So Russians reinforce their own positions in Bamako. They reinforce in different areas. And on 25th April attack, what we have seen is that after the few hours of fighting and the surprise, actually, of the shock, because it was a shock for everyone, including Russians, but after that, we have, we got reports that Russians started to deal with FLA and Jnim in order to avoid them being captured or killed on different positions in the north. especially so what they did is they opened channels with these groups and found the deal that they leave a certain amount of vehicles and weapons and stuff behind them and they will be allowed to leave the city and then we have seen videos showing russian troops leaving by truck their position are leaving malians behind them which was a huge one could say betrayal because they were supposed to be partners and they ended leaving their partner in the desert which will never happen with the french or americans or any western country because this is a partnership so you cannot leave your partner behind you and russians are has pretty much try to hide these deals presenting them as fake throwing them as a fake news but if you look at if both fla engineering statements statements public statement statements you will see that both groups ask actually directly russia to stay out of this conflict they say this is a malian story russians doesn't have to be involved in that and if they are see if they agree to stay out of this story they will be allowed to leave freely without any clash without any loss and for now i don't know exactly whether it was a local decision like a local russian commander that said okay we will start dealing with these people and we will leave because we are fucking surrounded that we have no issue to leave this area without getting seriously and in insured but or whether it was an order from moscow directly but what i what i know is that they had a lots of injured soldiers on the ground on 25th april one helicopter mi-8 if i remember were shot down by the terrorist with a manpad which was the anti-aircraft missile and this helicopter was what we call a nurse and a nurse is basically an helicopter you use mostly to save and extradite like take out of the field injured soldiers so this helicopter this nurse was shot down by the terrorists so russia has no longer capabilities besides i mean air capabilities to save his their troops injured on the field or extract the bodies or extract the injured soldiers injured soldiers you they could do that only by road but remember Mali is so huge that by road it will take you hours if not days to get to a nearby hospital for your Russian hospital or Russian camp to heal your troops this was one of the key issues for them and I think it's kind of logical that you don't want to really sacrifice your troops just for the pleasure of losing your troops like at the end of the day they are humans they don't want to die and especially Russians are far from their home they are far from the battlefield in Ukraine it's not like in Ukraine in Ukraine you can imagine they are fighting they are close to their country maybe they really believe that Ukraine is a threat but in Mali they are far from everything far from the family they can barely contact them anyway so they don't really want to die there especially since they have seen what's happening in Tinza Watson to Wagner which are true experienced guys in the field remember that this Russian troop sent by Africa Corp are mostly young men poorly experienced in the combat they have a lot of specialists like for example pilots helicopter pilots armored vehicle pilots drone pilots and so on electronic warfare specialists but they are not people that are used to fight into heavy and intense clashes unlike Wagner in the past Wagner has a lot of experience because they fought in Syria they were deployed in Libya in Mozambique they were deployed in Central Africa they were deployed in Mali so they accumulated a lot of combat experience and they were not how do you say that they were not scared of fighting and remember the first Wagner guys were old military ex-military guys that has even more experience in the past some of them were intelligent some of them were infantry or whatever and they just had this huge combat experience which the current Africa Corps doesn't have at all and this is one of the reasons why even among the Malian government from various sources I had to talk with there is a dissension among the Malian military government on whether they should rely on Russia or not because for example Sadio Kamara which has been killed in the terrorist attack on 25th April which is the minister he was is pretty much open to Russia and very aligned with them and trying to push their own agenda among the Malian government. And this is how they pretty much got access to Mali and deployed there. But the leader of the Malian government, which is Asimigoita, isn't really satisfied with Russians, especially since they lost in Tinza Watan, especially since they cost kind of money, actually. Remember, under Wagner, they had their guys deployed in different gold mines in the country to finance themselves. And yeah, basically Asimigoita, from what I know, doesn't really enjoy that much the Russians, unlike Sadu Kamara, which is now dead. And actually, Asimigoita was more open and favorable to work with Turkish troops. If you pay attention in the news, you will see that Mali tried to get closer to Turkey in various ways, opening diplomatic channels, exchanging goods, and so on. So Mali will probably, in the future, try to have closer ties with Turkey instead of Russia. Not only because Turkey does it better, I mean, providing security or providing drones, TB2, which is widely used in Africa nowadays, or having a closer diplomatic relation, but also because Turkey is a NATO state. And since Mali was trying to work only with Russia, and Russia is at war with Ukraine, and therefore in an indirect conflict with the European Union, Mali cut itself out of European founding and also American founding. But if they choose to align with Turkey in the near future, there is also this logic that since you work with a NATO member, which is Turkey, we might open to you more funding and help, even on intelligence levels. So I think this is probably the reason behind this. But yeah, keep in mind that Russia actually somehow negotiated alone with terrorist groups in the north after 25th April attacks. They retreated from various positions, and they lost at least one of the copters, they lost a few bit years, they left behind them lots of money and equipment. And now it seems like... They are just trying to recoup. But I think the Malian opinion, public opinion isn't really satisfied with Russians. Not only Malian officers were complaining about Russians leaving them behind, which is kind of unacceptable for anyone on the field. But also, if you look like after the 25th April attack, the leader of the government, Asimigoita, was out of the screen for like four days. And even it was weird for everyone. Like people thought he was dead or something or hiding somewhere. But after coming back on the national television, like, sorry, before coming back to the national television, what the Malian government did is publishing an image of Asimigoita meeting with a Russian delegation, which was led by the Russian ambassador in Mali, Igor Gromyko. And this gives you a hint on how angry was the Malian government to our Russians, because it's not logical for a leader, which was kind of targeted by terrorist attack. And the first thing he does when he publicly appears is to see the Russian counterparts, even before talking to his own people, even seeing the injured Malian troops. So it just gives you an idea that this meeting with Asimigoita and the Russian delegation was very kind of spicy. I mean, I can understand Malian being very angry with our Russians for leaving them behind them on the field and from various sources. I know that Malians actually complained to Russia and asked them basically, like, what the fuck, guys, are you doing on the ground? Like, you can't just leave us behind and leave your position. Like, we're paying you to support our troops on the ground. So what are you doing, guys? And I think from my understanding that Russians offered to send even more troops into Mali. I think they offered them to send more equipment as well. But I'm not sure exactly what happened since then. So I will keep an eye on that. But yeah, the dynamic with Russia isn't as good as people could think. I think it's more logical for Mali to try to multiply its partnership and find a better partner, whether it's China, whether it's Russia, it's Turkey, whether it's the US or whatever countries they can rely on for their activities. But as for... Now, it seems that the relation with Russia is very damaged. I think the public image of Russia overall is pretty much damaged. They have been quiet over like three days after the attacks, not even publishing any single video or photo anyway of their activities on the ground. And then they started a new information campaign. You know, there's this infowar ongoing on the internet anyway. And they started now to start their own infowarfare campaign to convince that they are useful and doing something on the ground. But again, these Russian troops are acting like support groups to the Malian Corps army. And, yeah, they are not that many on the ground. But, yeah, this is pretty much what I can say about Russia for now. All right. Thank you, Kassus. That's a very in-depth answer. And you actually went a little farther than I had initially pictured. And I'm really grateful for that. And you're really grateful for you sharing your expertise, specifically on the issue of hockey. That's something I really wanted to dig deep into. And you've already done so because as so we put out a video a little while back on warframes, as I've mentioned, saying that Russia's failures in Mali could conceivably be the death of its Africa ambitions. And we listed Turkey as one of the countries that could conceivably have a plan to take advantage of this exposed Russian weakness. So in the interest of time, considering we have been here for a bit over an hour and about 15 minutes now, I want to move on to what will be my final question for today's podcast, Kassus. Why didn't ECOWAS or any other African nation help Mali despite the obvious dangers of what will happen in case Janim and the FLA were able to establish an even stronger foothold in Mali than they already do? So why was the African Union, why was ECOWAS, why was the region basically quiet and letting these attacks happen? Actually, this is a very good question. But I will just put some context that since 2023, the Mali has joined the Marlins, which is the way in French we say Allianz d'état du Sahel. But in English, it will sound like the Sahel Alliance or something like that with Burkina Faso and Niger. I will just let the Mali and embarrassed the Gianlują Faso. I think it will sound apparently. Thank you. and when they started this islands one of their main arguments is that echo was actually too weak to act or to get involved in any conflict or saves solves their own problems so they created this so you cannot create your own alliance and expect your former group to come and save you from your own mistakes i think there's a question of sovereignty first for the audience the sahelian alliance itself but if you look at the news you can see there's a very little statements made by burkina faso and niger on what happened in mali and even with that from what i know they have not been a lot of troops like i don't have seen any burkina faso troops or niger troops being sent to mali to help them and retake the cities they lost maybe they sent some drones or aircraft as a support to the malian army but that's it and therefore you cannot expect echo was to start deploying troops for yourself after you argued for years that you don't want to be part of it anymore you see it as a weak controlled organism by western states and you wanted to start your own island so i mean you can't ask for everything at the same time either you want to be sovereign and you create your audience or you agree to work with echo west and ask them for help when you are in a struggle which mali didn't do so far as far as i know so there's this main topic and the other thing is other neighboring states like guinea connectory senegal ivory coast ghana benin togo and so on they didn't really move to help either mali because they were already suffering from this vacuum left by the french the americans and so on and when this country's this western country left the country the mali especially there was a huge vacuum and space for terrorist groups to progress on the ground and try to play with the border because one of the key things with this terrorist groups is they love to stay near a border and just jump here and there so you cannot if you're deploying troops let's say mali you to chase terrorist groups near Algerian border. The second these groups jump into Algerian borders, your Malian troops are not allowed to cross the border because it will be a statement of war, like a declaration of war. You cannot send troops if you're not asking for before in the neighboring state. So this is one of the issues for the neighboring southern countries and they have been suffering from this terrorist group spreading their influence. If you look at Senegal, it has reinforced its border with its own army since two years now because they are afraid of this terrorist incursion on their own territory. Guinea has done the same. Ivory Coast has deployed drones, helicopters, special forces at the border just to keep an eye on what's going on out there. Benin especially has a lot of problems with terrorist groups crossing the border in the north. This is a huge issue for Benin especially because the terrorist groups have taken control over some small village. I mean when I say taking control is it's more like they are sending their own Inams into the small villages. They are sending, they are taking control over some markets. They are flooding some markets with goods and therefore fueling their own economy. And they are trying to do the same in Togo. They are trying to do the same in Ghana as well. So at the end of the day, you cannot be responsible for the mess you create to your neighboring countries and at the same time ask the regional institution, which is Ecolas, to save your ass and help you after you bitched about it for years. I mean you created the alliance of Sahelian states, okay? You wanted sovereignty, you brought about it to the whole Africa that you were independent and going to create something different, which I can understand actually in the idea. But you cannot expect the former institution to come and help you or just ask for anyone to help you if you brought about sovereignty for decades, for years before. But the main worst thing for me is that Burkina Faso and Niger didn't send much of their forces where you could expect them to send a lot of their forces. I mean especially Burkina Faso, which has quite decent forces. They could have sent troops into... to reinforce their positions, maybe work on the triple border with Niger and make sure that at least Jejunim doesn't expand too much or try to deploy various aircrafts. So, I don't know, I'm just a little surprised these other allied countries for Mali didn't really react that much. But instead of that, Mali seems to have relied more on Russians. They seem to realize that maybe Russians aren't the right answer to their own problem. I mean, you cannot fix your own security problem by inviting a third country in your country and expect them to do the job for you. You have to handle this problem by yourself and at some point find an issue or find a deal with those groups or either find a deal with our groups or totally eradicate them. So, this is a very Malian problem. I don't think any other country can solve it by themselves. I mean, I don't think the French didn't do it. We haven't solved this problem for Malians. Americans did not. Russia isn't solving the problem either. Even Turkey, if Mali wanted to start a closer collaboration, I don't think they will be able to solve this issue. I think this is a Malian problem. They need to find a solution for that by themselves. I think it's great that they open different partnerships with various countries and try to find more islands abroad at international level. But at the same time, I'm kind of surprised that other neighboring countries, especially Burkina Faso and Niger, haven't done much for them if you compare to what Russia did, actually. So, it's kind of weird for me to see that Russia is getting paid a lot, deployed a lot in Mali, but you don't see any Burkina Faso troops or Niger troops, which will be more logical, even for the common security of the aliens, anyway. So, yeah, this is pretty much what I can say, but I don't expect ECOWAS to react pretty much in the near future for Mali. Maybe Russians will leave the country, but I don't think they will leave in the near future either because they committed too much in Mali. So, maybe we'll see more of Turkish footprints in Mali in the future. I know they already have their drones present in the country. They have some security forces answering the safety of Asamigoita. And who knows what will be the future. But again, I think this is a very Malian problem, and only Malians can find the issue for that. All right. Right. And with that quote that only Malians can find a solution to a Malian problem, we're going to end it here. Kassus Belli, thank you so much for joining us. And to all our listeners on every corner of this planet, thank you so much for giving us your time. We're going to keep our eye on the situation in Mali because, as we mentioned, this is a rapidly evolving situation. And it is one where what we thought we knew turns out to be flipped on its head. And those are the most interesting geopolitical situations to follow. Thank you so much, Kassus. Thank you so much to our listeners. I hope it's a lovely day. Bye. Thank you.