Polarization in France: An Ideological Cold War That's Heating Up

For decades, French political divisions were confined mostly to fringe protests and online spaces. But, the beating of Quentin Deranque by far-left militants on February 12 sparked a furor. Two days later, when Deranque passed away from his injuries, the relative calm of French politics seemed to die with him. France’s political division spilled into the mainstream just before mayoral elections, in some areas dismantling traditional alliances that have long managed to keep fringe parties from power. Now, as the federal election approaches in 2027, the increasing momentum of both extremes could signal a collapse for the moderate political center, with consequences for much of the western alliance.

From Basements to Bookstores within the Underground Front

The far-left group that was connected to the killing is La Jeune Garde, a militant antifascist collective. The group was founded in Lyon in 2018 by four men, one of whom was Raphaël Archenault, who is now a member of the left-wing political party La France Insoumise (LFI). La Jeune Garde was created with the intention of acting as a counter to the heavy presence of far-right groups in Lyon, which had by then developed a reputation for attacks on minorities. Although it initially presented itself as a non-violent movement focused on defense, La Jeune Garde has been involved in various clashes throughout the years, including the 2024 beating of a 15-year-old boy on public transit.

La Jeune Garde was forcibly dissolved by the French government in 2025 for what was referred to as “provocation of violent acts and incitement of hatred.” Obviously, this move proved ineffective. Like many other civic extremist groups that have faced the same ruling, La Jeune Garde continued to operate, just with more secrecy.

The other side of the political ecosystem in Lyon is much larger, a network of varied groups that range from nationalist to traditionalist Catholic. There’s Les Ramparts, the most popular right-wing youth organization in the city, which has taken up anti-immigrant and anti-Islam ideals similar to many of the region’s other ultra-conservative factions. Like Jeune Garde, Les Ramparts was dissolved for promoting hatred and suspected to have taken its operations underground.

Then, there’s the neo-fascist Allobroges Bourgoin, of which Quentin Deranque was the co-founder. Known for its extreme views, les Allobroges has been tied to several other local ultranationalist groups and “active clubs,” or supremacist fight clubs where young men can go to play sports, work out, or train in combat and weapon skills. More than that, though, these networks bring likeminded parties out of online spaces and into in-person circles, where they can be further exposed to nationalist ideologies. These gyms have therefore become a hub for the recruitment and mobilization of those who are willing to use violence to defend themselves and their nations against a perceived “white genocide.” According to Alexander Ritzmann, Senior Advisor with the Counter Extremism Project, active clubs’ focus on both combat and organization creates a type of standby militia that can be activated at a moment’s notice.

The day he was beaten, Quentin and les Allobroges had been asked to provide security at a protest hosted by Collectif Némésis. Another part of the far-right ecosystem, Collectif is a femonationalist sect known for staging high-visibility protests against immigration and what they call Islamogauchistes, or the Islamic left, whose tolerance for multiculturalism is blamed throughout France for a perceived erosion of women’s safety and Western values. The women's group developed a reputation for bringing male security to their protests and attempting to bait the opposition into clashes. On this day, they were protesting outside of Sciences Po university, where the LFI’s Rima Hassan was scheduled to deliver a lecture.

To understand why Lyon is so tilted toward the right, we must look at its past. It’s a city with a longstanding conservative culture that’s tied closely to Traditionalist Catholicism. Throughout history, the clergy in the many cathedrals and churches of the Praying Hill have worked hard to preserve their customs. Today, that makes Old Lyon a stronghold for French hard-right groups, who have moved their active clubs and social spaces into the area.

On the other side of the Saône River, the historical home of the working class, is Lyon’s Croix-Rousse Hill. With a record of revolt leading back to the uprisings of silk weavers in the 19th century, it provides the perfect home for the increasing number of anti-fascists and left-wing activists who are looking to respond to the right’s xenophobia and violence. They have gathering spots in Lyon too, although certainly fewer. La Plume Noire, an anarchist bookstore in Croix-Rousse, developed a reputation in the ‘90s as a rallying point for those who opposed far-right politics. Because of that, it’s been subject to arson and vandalism over the years. For example, after the death of Quentin Deranque, the storefront was spray-painted with a Celtic Cross, an icon that’s commonly used by neo-Nazi organizations.

The Viral Afterlife of Quentin Deranque

Although he has been compared online to the American conservative activist Charlie Kirk, the manner of Deranque’s slaying was notably different. During what looked like a small protest, a fight broke out between Quentin and members of the Jeune Garde. After falling to the ground, Deranque was seen being punched and kicked by several men. He was transported to the hospital, where he passed away on February 14; an autopsy revealed a fractured skull and brain injuries.

In the days following his death, right-wing media outlets jumped on the opportunity to frame Deranque as a martyr, downplaying his neo-fascist connections in favor of his recent conversion to Catholicism. They talked about his volunteer work at homeless shelters and soup kitchens. Meanwhile, factions that have traditionally been at odds, from traditionalist Catholics to hardened neo-nazi groups, united against the left. Public debate spread across the country, with several people using the incident to paint the far-left as violent.

The response on social media was incendiary; users posted attacks against the left and racist memes under the hashtag #JusticePourQuentin. On their pages, Collectif Némésis called the attack a lynching, posting “the far left kills” while calling for justice. Misinformation of all kinds ran rampant, with far-right activists taking to X to unmask those involved, wrongfully identifying “suspects” and opening the way for online harassment toward them and their families.

A week after Deranque’s death, the online rage spilled back into the streets with a protest that attracted over 3,000 people. Men dressed in black and wearing masks took over the streets of Lyon in what was supposed to be a “white march,” or a silent march for remembrance. Far from silent, though, participants were seen shouting racist slurs and giving Nazi salutes. Deranque’s own family avoided the march, and, through their attorney, condemned any form of political violence while asking the public for calm.

Smaller demonstrations have also been held in Deranque’s honor, including a neo-nazi night march. Several left-wing political offices were vandalized with red paint and multiple representatives of LFI reported receiving threats. Someone even went as far as submitting a bomb threat against the party’s office, prompting an evacuation of the building.

Then, politicians from across the spectrum began to question LFI’s connections with La Jeune Garde. Not only was it founded by LFI’s Raphaël Archenault, but one of Archenault’s aides, Jacques-Elie Favrot, was arrested in connection with the recent beating. When LFI leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon denied that his party had any sort of involvement with the killing, some leaders called him out for failing to meet his moral and ethical duties as a leader.

On the international stage, right-aligned figures from Europe and across the Atlantic started to weigh in, using the tragedy to push ideological divisions further. Right-wing Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called it a “wound for all of Europe,” which prompted criticism from the French leader. The US State Department of Counterterrorism said that “radical leftism is on the rise,” calling it a threat to public safety, despite data showing that the majority of political violence in France between 1986 and 2016 has been committed by far-right actors.

From Local Elections to Presidential Power

Considering its polling numbers were low even before the backlash, some thought that the death of Quentin Deranque could prove to be the final blow to the Republican Front, or the parliamentary coalition strategy that allows French mainstream parties to overrule the far-right. Because of the right’s historical violence and hateful rhetoric, mainstream parties have traditionally been able to hold onto this cordon sanitaire.

But, the framing of Deranque as a martyr allowed the far-right, for a short time, to claim a moral high-ground that had eluded them before. Mayoral elections, held on March 15 and 22, were expected to act as a good predictor of voter trends ahead of the presidential election next year, and pre-election polling showed strong support for the Rassemblement National, France’s most prominent far-right party. The RN runs on an anti-immigration and France-first platform, and border control. However, when the votes came in, the results were not quite what the polls had predicted.

In Lyon, the race was close. The incumbent green party, Les Verts, beat out the center-right candidate by fewer than 3,000 votes. The left held its 25-year leadership record in Paris, where Socialist Emmanuel Gregoire formed a coalition with other traditional progressive parties, insisting that the capital will never belong to the hard-right. He won with 50.5% of the vote. In Marseille, Socialist Mayor Benoît Payan was re-elected in the second round with 54.3% of the vote compared to his far-right counterpart’s 40.3%.

But, the extreme right did see success in some areas. In France’s fifth most-populous city, Nice, former mainstream conservative Éric Ciotti took the mayorship after his Union des Droites pour la République formed an alliance with the Rassemblement National. The RN itself made historic gains in smaller cities, especially in the south, taking control of more than 60 municipalities. Party President Jordan Bardella considered it a victory, saying that this rural support is just the beginning of the party’s success. However, the party’s failure to win Marseille, its biggest target, may suggest otherwise.

With the RN failing to take hold of major French cities, many are wondering whether Jordan Bardella, who is widely seen to be the favorite in the upcoming 2027 elections, will be able to take the presidency. As seen with Nice mayor-elect Éric Ciotti, who was ousted from his traditional Republican party after suggesting a coalition with the RN, many more moderate parties still aren’t willing to align themselves with the far-right.

The extreme left also made some gains; LFI candidates were elected in around a dozen smaller French cities. Its victories were mostly in working-class and low-income areas, including the Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis. This is the first time in the party’s 10-year history that it’s seen such success in elections. However, like with the RN, center-left parties like the Socialists, Greens and Communists were still reluctant, in most places, to create alliances with the far-left party.

In short, the electoral takeaway was mixed. Extremist factions of right and left have clearly found new pockets of public support. But it’s an open question whether these pockets are large enough to propel the fringes to power in 2027.

The answer will likely be determined by two factors: the cohesion of the moderate Front Républicain and the ability of the more extreme parties to formalize parliamentary alliances. Success for the far-left depends on the Socialists’ willingness to coordinate with the LFI, while the viability of the far-right rests on its ability to continue to pull moderate republicans toward the fringes.

However, with several far-right candidates losing out in second-round elections, it’s clear that the cordon sanitaire may still be a viable strategy against both extremes. While the strategy worked in major metros like Paris and Marseille, the RN’s expansion into dozens of smaller municipalities points toward a deepening divide between rural and urban voters. And, with the killing of Quentin Deranque still keeping moderate-left parties from aligning themselves with the LFI, the same cordon sanitaire used against the right is now isolating the radical left from its mainstream allies.

The 2027 outcome, therefore, will depend on the reparation of old alliances and the formation of new ones, as well as whether the far-right can translate its support in small and mid-sized cities to the larger areas where the traditional republican front still holds strong. In France, the center has held before, but it’s never faced such pressure from both sides at once.