The Janus Program: America’s Answer to Chinese Small Modular Reactors?

On October 14, 2025, the United States Army announced the launch of the Janus Program, an initiative to build a cutting-edge, fully operational nuclear microreactor, and then produce that microreactor at scale, to power US military installations at home and abroad.

If successful, the program will offer a major leap forward for the United States, offering power resiliency on US bases at home, and enabling more complex forward deployments, if used abroad. The program’s true value, however, may not lie in its implications for the US military itself, but in its potential to counter a global push by China, to offer small nuclear reactors to the nations of the world.

This possible dual application of the Janus Program has not yet been formally acknowledged by the US military, by representatives of associated private industry, or by any other in-the-know parties with connections to the program. If, however, Janus is intended to quietly fill this gap, or the resulting technology is later repurposed as such, then the program will offer the United States the opportunity to compete with China in the global energy sector, for decades to come.

Note: For a further explanation of the Janus Program and its potential as an SMR counter to China, we’ve produced a premium video episode, available to Fronts.co subscribers. Join us here to gain access.

Understanding Janus.

By all official indicators, the Janus Program is designed to address what the National Defense Magazine called, in 2010, the “Oppressive Tyranny of Fuel”: the United States’ dependence on fossil fuels, and their corresponding power infrastructure, to sustain domestic and global military operations.

In the United States, military bases are typically reliant on local power infrastructure, and in most cases—barring the presence of local nuclear power plants, hydropower facilities, etc.—local power infrastructure is reliant on the burning of fossil fuels. As such, bases and other installations face an inherent risk: If fuel supply is cut off, civilian power infrastructure is compromised, or it otherwise becomes impossible to draw power from the outside world, then those bases will go dark.

In the United States, those installations are required to maintain Black Start capability; they must have the means to power themselves, without a connection to external energy infrastructure, in the case of emergency. In most cases, however, US bases can only fulfill Black Start obligations on a limited basis. They can rely on backup generators, using a fuel supply that’s stored on-base, but that fuel will eventually run out, and the vast majority of US military installations do not have sufficient backup capability to power bases through nuclear, wind, solar, geothermal, or other non-fossil means.

In the event of an attack on the United States—particularly an attack that would compromise regional or nationwide power infrastructure—US bases will not be able to avoid going dark, if civilian power infrastructure is not restored quickly.

The tyranny-of-fuel problem also extends to US deployments abroad, where energy availability is a key limiting factor for foreign operations, especially in austere environments where the US military must provide its own power source. Limited energy reserves mean smaller forward operating bases, fewer air-defense systems, restricted ability to operate large radar installations, and more.

In theory, nuclear energy would seem to be a natural answer to America’s problem, but until now, the US has not invested at scale in the sort of technology that would address this challenge—specifically, portable nuclear microreactors. Generally understood as a nuclear reactor that produces between one and twenty megawatts of electricity, nuclear microreactors are a step below small modular reactors (SMRs) in size.

A modern nuclear microreactor can be as small as a shipping container, easily transported on a truck bed, a small seagoing vessel, or a military airlifter. They can, in theory, operate with minimal requirements for maintenance support on the ground, they can be deployed in groups to provide increased power capacity, and they require no connection to an external power grid. For military purposes, they provide easily deployed, light, mobile energy autonomy.

The Janus Program aims to develop nuclear microreactors for that very reason, first to be deployed on military bases on US soil, and then to support operations abroad, if the technology proves to be reliable. The program will partner with a range of US companies devoted to the production of SMRs and microreactors, including Radiant Industries—which has already agreed to participate—and eligible companies including BWXT, Westinghouse, and General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems, among others.

While several eligible companies are currently focused on building larger SMRs, Janus will prompt participating groups to produce microreactors of 20MW capacity or less. Each microreactor prototype will then be delivered to at least one of nine US Army bases on American soil; those sites have already been chosen. Once delivered, those prototypes will undergo an iterative process of testing and modification, until each endeavor yields a model that is ready for commercial-grade production.

Notably, the program appears likely to result in the creation of several commercial-grade designs, suggesting that Janus will provide much-needed stimulus to the US nuclear energy industry, and may provide a level of design resilience and operational versatility that exceeds that of most US military procurement programs.

Once microreactors are produced at scale, and assigned to US military bases permanently, they are expected to provide indefinite Black Start capability to bolster US homeland defense. Abroad, they may enable the integration of energy-intensive radar and sensor systems, data centers, directed-energy weapons, and other previously unavailable capabilities at US forward operating positions.

China.

In parallel to the Janus Program in the United States, China is hard at work developing its own miniaturized nuclear reactors, although Beijing has prioritized the development of higher-output SMRs, instead of the microreactors favored by the Janus Program. In the 21st century, China has prioritized the rapid development of nuclear technology, with the apparent dual objectives of military parity with the United States and Russia, and ubiquity of civil nuclear infrastructure to power Chinese communities.

While China has worked hard to construct traditional, large reactors, it has also prioritized the development of SMRs with a power yield between 20 MW and 300 MW. China brought its first fully operational SMR online in 2023, in Shandong province, and has continued to advance and improve its SMR technology in the intervening time.

Internationally, China has signaled a clear intent to provide SMR technology to client nations, distributing its SMRs to communities all across the globe. To that end, China has focused its efforts on developing safe, easily maintained, non-proliferating SMRs as quickly as possible, as a facet of its larger Belt and Road Initiative and other geopolitical development projects.

For client nations, the appeal is obvious. Across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, regional power shortages and energy crises are common, and often coincide with the breakdown of critical infrastructure in underdeveloped areas. To provide an SMR in those areas could be life-changing for hundreds of thousands of people at a time, vastly reducing regional dependence on a national power grid, and allowing existing power grids to better serve their remaining clients, once large sections of a nation are taken offline.

China intends to deliver at least thirty SMRs to Belt and Road participant nations by 2030, and China’s immense production capacity in other industries would suggest that if its early SMR projects reveal global demand, Beijing will be able to react quickly and fill the gap. While the price of an exported Chinese SMR is not currently clear, China’s willingness to offer development partnership to nations today, in exchange for debt to be paid back tomorrow, suggests that China will be able to ensure that the initial costs of obtaining an SMR are not prohibitive.

Place this initiative into context, in light of the rapidly intensifying great-power competition between China and the United States, and the geopolitical implications are obvious. For Beijing, SMRs present an option to provide partner nations the sort of energy-infrastructure support that can rapidly alleviate widespread social ills, rehabilitate entire nationwide power grids, and grant partner governments the option to either funnel resources toward other development initiatives, or,  more cynically, to recover those resources for themselves.

In accepting an SMR, or multiple SMRs, from Beijing, partner nations are given powerful incentives to remain friendly and, if necessary, compliant with Beijing’s geopolitical goals. If nations can ensure that China views them as allies and partners, they are at far lesser risk that their new source of energy could be used as a point of leverage in the future, or could conceivably be tampered with, in order to coerce compliance in a later dispute.

Similar to military exports, China can disincentivize partner nations from misbehaving, by ensuring that SMR operation is contingent on China’s continual support. SMRs will require software updates from the manufacturer, they will demand the signing of sustainment contracts to make sure that replacement parts are available, and they may be subject to right-to-repair, non-proliferation, or supervision clauses, requiring continual access and re-approval from representatives of Chinese industry—and thus, of the Chinese government itself.

China may even be able to demand energy-exclusivity arrangements, in order to ensure that nations host entire regions that are energy-dependent on Beijing indefinitely. In exchange for the guarantee of a backup reactor available in case of emergency, Beijing may prove able to compel partner nations to avoid connecting SMR-served regions to a wider power grid, in a set of restrictive terms that may be worth the short-term benefits of SMR adoption.

As such, the ability to mass-produce and distribute SMRs to global clients would hand China a powerful geopolitical advantage in the decades to come. While defense guarantees, investment partnerships, military-industrial export contracts, and other international arrangements carry their own weight, the United States and other competitors would struggle to establish reliable partnerships with nations that openly depend on Chinese SMR technology to keep the lights on.

Best of all for Beijing, these arrangements could last for decades, or even a century or more. SMRs do require occasional refueling, but as long as the technology is sound, they should be able to operate practically indefinitely. Between the clear benefits of SMR partnership, and the clear disincentives to disengage, it’s not clear that client nations would ever find sufficient cause to disengage, even from a program that may become blatantly coercive over time.

• *China’s SMR advantage is contingent, however, on the expectation that China can impose a monopoly or near-monopoly on SMR and other portable nuclear-energy technology. Without global competitors, China can offer as restrictive terms as it deems acceptable, as long as partner nations still agree to participate.

Introduce a competitor, however—especially a geopolitical rival as influential as the United States—and China’s SMRs become a tool, not of internationally monopolistic energy coercion, but of a more friendly, less coercive, and less overbearing energy partnership. If the United States can offer a counterweight, in the form of its own reliable, commercially scalable SMR or microreactor, then it can prevent China from establishing the sorts of energy-client relationships that might otherwise make it impossible for Washington to break Beijing’s hold over developing nations.

A Fusion of Objectives.

As previously stated, the United States government and its industry partners have not given any public indication that the Janus Program is intended to counter Chinese SMR technology. Any conclusion, to that effect, is the product of inference. If the United States does wish to compete with China on SMRs, however, and counter global Chinese nuclear-energy-sharing initiatives more broadly, then Janus provides the only clear avenue for the US to develop and procure directly competitive technology.

Outside of the Janus Program, the United States nuclear industry lacks the means to offer a comparable product. US microreactor and SMR initiatives are chronically underfunded and deprioritized, when considered as publicly funded initiatives, while private industry has not witnessed the sort of market demand that would justify research-and-development expenditures.

The United States’ slowness to produce microreactors is not for any lack of technical capability. The US produced its first microreactor in 1939, under the auspices of the Manhattan Project, and the modern United States has the expertise and foundational knowledge required to attempt building a commercially scalable version. The impetus to do so, however, has been lacking until now—and, as such, China has claimed a decisive head start with its global SMR initiatives.

In that sense, the Janus Program represents a cash injection for the United States, providing established, capable companies with the financing they need, to support prototyping and early production. As in so many economic sectors, startup costs for a project like this are difficult to justify without clear indicators that the end product will be in-demand, but even without any acknowledgement of its potential geopolitical role, any microreactor that emerges from the Janus Program will be adopted by the US military—and may even be commercially viable as a power source for US communities, especially isolated ones.

Once microreactors are in production via US companies, the US would gain the ability to compete directly with Chinese SMRs. The locations and causes of global energy shortages are hardly a secret; the United States already has the capability to determine where, and when, China will likely attempt to offer its reactors.

By relying on a range of commercial partners to produce several microreactor variations, the US raises the odds that it will be able to provide options that are more form-fitting, more versatile in their capabilities, and more appealing to international buyers. In competition with what may be a single generic SMR from China, a US capability to offer different energy yields, different technical and maintenance requirements, different refueling schedules, and more, may provide a real competitive advantage.

Moreover, the Janus Program’s focus on producing microreactors imply a more versatile, and a more easily scaled-up series of commercial offerings. While a microreactor, by nature, does not offer the same energy output as a large SMR, microreactors can operate in unison, either as individually sold units, or integrated as a larger product offering.

Miniaturization matters, as well. By prioritizing a smaller prototype, the Janus Program incentivizes participating companies to deal with the problems of miniaturization sooner, knowing that generally, adapting a complex piece of technology to be miniaturized post-facto is more difficult than scaling up output.

Not all miniaturization programs are guaranteed to be difficult, but the Janus Program inoculates the United States against those challenges early, while allowing it to offer a miniaturized competitor microreactor to nations, provinces, or individual communities where the power output of an SMR may not be required. For clients that require greater power output, the US can offer multiple microreactors, capable of operating in unison, whereas China may struggle to offer cost-competitive technology to smaller clients.

At this time, any claim that the US intends to use its microreactors as part of a larger geopolitical competition should be treated as speculative in nature. What is abundantly clear, however, is that China intends to proceed with its own use of SMRs as part of its Belt and Road appeal to world nations—and that, if China gains a functional monopoly on the sale of this technology, it will be able to use that monopoly to further its own geopolitical objectives.

As China’s foremost geopolitical rival for the next several decades at least, the United States is in a unique position to challenge that monopoly. Whether or not it will choose to make that attempt, remains to be seen.

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