Tokyo's Bold Taiwan Bet

Friday the 7th of November was meant to be an ordinary day at the Japanese Diet, the country’s national parliament. Lawmakers were meant to engage in the sort of boring statecraft that barely makes national let alone international headlines.

But all that changed when Katsuya Okada, a member of the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party,  asked a question and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi responded with the statement that would spark an international crisis: that an attack on Taiwan by China could pose an existential threat to Japan. An existential threat that would force Japan to intervene on Taiwan’s side.

China, for its part, responded exactly as you would expect.

China’s Consul General in Osaka wrote, in a now deleted post on X, “We have no choice but simply cut off that dirty neck that has been lunged at us without hesitation. Are you ready?”

Beijing went further, with CCTV, the state broadcaster, saying that Takaichi’s remarks were of an “extremely malicious nature and impact” and “crossed the line.” It equated the Prime Minister’s reference to an existential threat with Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria. This is an extremely loaded comparison because during the invasion of Manchuria, Japan’s Imperial Army committed war crimes, including testing biological weapons on civilians and prisoners of war.

The spat happened at an interesting time, as Takaichi had recently met with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Apec summit in South Korea, where they vowed to build constructive and stable relations. Fast forward a few days, and constructive and stable relations are the furthest thing from the table, as the conflict seems to be getting worse. On Tuesday, the 2nd of December, Chinese and Japanese boats faced off near a group of geopolitically sensitive islands in the East China Sea, with both nations giving conflicting accounts of what happened.

As the diplomatic war of words between Beijing and Tokyo rages on, understanding what drove Takaichi's statement, and where it might lead, is crucial to grasping the shifting power dynamics in East Asia.

The Why

According to some Japan observers, the reason why Prime Minister Takaichi made these remarks could be as simple as sleep deprivation. As Takaichi told MPs in early November, she sleeps for two to four hours a day.

Now, while this is a plausible theory, Jeff Kingston, a professor of Asian studies at Temple University, Japan, doesn’t think it’s possible. Such comments were too crucial to explain away as a simple gaffe.

In a piece for Time Magazine, he argues that not only is the conflict good for Beijing because it distracts from local economic troubles, it’s also good for Tokyo because it helps Takaichi rally support for her goal of increasing defense spending.

In her first policy speech, Takaichi told parliament that Japan would increase military spending to 2% of GDP by March 2026, a goal previously set for 2027. She cited the threat posed by China, North Korea and Russia, saying that their military activities and other actions had caused grave concern. While Takaichi did face some pushback from critics worried about the cost, it’s becoming more difficult to oppose the rationale behind increasing defense spending. Every time a Chinese official, or state media, ratchets up the tension Takaichi is proven correct in her assessment that Japan needs a solid defense system in place.

Beyond bolstering her push for defense spending, Kingston argues that the move could be seen as a calculated appeal to her conservative base. It’s a view that River Akira Davis, a Tokyo-based correspondent for the New York Times, agrees with. Writing for the Times, she notes that Takaichi’s statement had increased her appeal as a conservative strong on defense, particularly among young citizens increasingly willing to question the nation’s longstanding pacifism.

However, that isn’t to say the entire nation is behind the PM. According to a survey by Kyodo News, a nonprofit news agency based in Tokyo, 44.2% of the country don’t support Japan stepping in to defend Taiwan in case of an attack by China.

That’s what Prime Minister Takaichi stood to gain locally. What about internationally?

In his piece for Time Magazine, Kingston argues that there are two possible geopolitical motivations. First, the PM might have hoped that by positioning herself as a strong anti-China hawk willing to stand up to Beijing, even at the risk of retaliation, she could earn President Trump’s respect. During a January 2020 interview, Trump said he gets along better with tougher and meaner leaders, pointing to Russia’s President Putin and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Takaichi may have calculated that adopting their confrontational style could earn her credibility in Trump's eyes as someone who doesn't back down, who speaks bluntly about threats, and who projects strength over diplomatic niceties. Only time will tell if that calculation pays off, but it's clear Takaichi is testing if mimicking their playbook can increase her international standing.

Beyond courting Trump's favor, Tokyo might have had another concern.

Tokyo could have been spooked by the increased cooperation between Beijing and Washington, and the talks of a G2- a hypothetical grouping that while lacking the formal structure of the G7 carries significant weight simply because it involves the world's two largest economies (assuming you don’t count the EU as a single economy, given that it’s slightly larger than China’s). The idea of the G2 got a lot more credibility after President Trump posted on Truth Social, “The G2 will be convening shortly.”

According to the Associated Press, by publicly acknowledging the G2, Trump delighted China but worried all of America’s allies concerned with China’s ascending global power. As Neil Thomas told the AP, “The G2 concept implies that China and the United States are peers on the global stage and their positions should be given equal weight.”

For Japan, the fear of the G2 is twofold. First, it’s a painful reminder of the post World War Two order that has seen Tokyo’s international influence decline with each passing decade. Second, if Beijing and Washington improve their ties, it could undermine Japan’s regional interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific.

These fears had to have been amplified after Trump reportedly called Takaichi and advised her not to provoke Beijing on the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Officials briefed on the call told the Wall Street Journal that Trump’s advice was subtle and that he didn’t pressure Takaichi to walk back her comments. While he didn’t pressure the PM, the timing was very conspicuous as the call happened immediately after a 30-minute call between Trump and Xi, during which Xi reportedly spent 15 minutes hammering home China’s historic claim to Taiwan as well as Washington and Beijing’s joint responsibility to manage the world order.

Now, it’s important to point out that Japan has denied the Wall Street Journal’s reporting, however, if it’s true, it might give the clearest insight into Prime Minister Takaichi’s thinking. The statement was probably less about domestic politics, and more an attempt at ensuring Japan remains relevant in a world that is increasingly moving towards China.

The more pressing concern is whether this conflict could escalate beyond a war of words.

According to Justin McCurry, the Guardian’s Tokyo correspondent, it could.

Writing for The Guardian on the 17th of November, he said, “While a military confrontation is highly unlikely, analysts have long warned that increased activity in disputed areas like the Senkakus and Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (Adiz) raises the risk of accidents that could spiral into hostilities.”

The Senkakus are those geopolitically sensitive islands.

It took less than three weeks for McCurry’s prediction to be proven at least partially correct, when vessels from China and Japan briefly faced off in disputed waters. While a full-scale conflict remains unlikely, requiring a catastrophic miscalculation on either side, the incident demonstrates how quickly tensions can escalate from rhetoric to confrontation.

The spat with Beijing, however, offers more than just headlines. It provides the clearest window into how Takaichi plans to navigate international relations

Foreign Policy Lessons

Takaichi became Prime Minister on the 21st of October which means that she has only been in office for about a month so on one hand, it feels a little too soon to make any definitive judgments about her foreign policy. On the other hand, this spat with Beijing has provided enough material to at least sketch out the broad contours of how she plans to tackle foreign policy.

So here’s what Takaichi’s first month and change in office indicate about her foreign policy.

First, Takaichi will follow in Shinzo Abe’s footsteps, and she might be willing to go even further than the late former Prime Minister.

This needs some context.

When Takaichi first came to power, most people outside Japan were unfamiliar with her, so the media came up with an effective shorthand to give the public an idea of what they could expect, describing her as Shinzo Abe’s protégé. This meant that she was expected to rule in much the same way as the former Prime Minister, and to have the same policy priorities such as strengthening Japan’s military capabilities, strengthening ties with the U.S., and further reorienting Tokyo towards Taiwan.

According to David Sacks, Asia Studies Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Before Abe’s tenure, Japanese officials were deeply uncomfortable talking about a potential invasion of Taiwan, the implications of such a move for Japanese security, and how Japan should respond. Abe changed that. As Prime Minister, he referred to Taiwan as an important partner and friend of Japan, and signed a deal with Taiwan on fishing rights in the East China sea, one of the most contentious issues between the two.  After leaving office, he would continue being an advocate for stronger ties with Taipei, arguing that a Taiwan emergency would be an emergency for Japan and therefore the Japan-US alliance.

Observers expected Takaichi to continue in a similar vein, implicitly moving Japan closer to Taiwan while avoiding any explicit mentions that would anger China until after her term was over. No one expected her to make such an explicit statement about Taiwan while still in office, and certainly not within her first month as Prime Minister.

Beyond the statement, Takaichi's crisis management reveals more about how she will handle foreign affairs.

At the time of writing, the Prime Minister has not retracted her remarks despite increasing pressure from Beijing to do so. Instead she sent Masaaki Kanai, the Director General of the Japanese foreign ministry’s Asia and Oceania bureau, to try and calm tensions with China. According to Japanese media, Kanai was expected to explain that Takaichi’s comment didn’t signal a shift in Japanese security policy. Additionally, several Japanese lawmakers including Yuko Obuchi, an influential member of the Prime Minister’s Liberal Democratic Party, met with China’s ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao in Tokyo in a further attempt at cooling tensions.

By refusing to retract her statement publicly while quietly sending diplomats to smooth things over behind the scenes, Takaichi is attempting a delicate balancing act. She's signaling to her conservative base and the international community that she won't be bullied by Beijing, that she is as tough and uncompromising as Trump or Erdogan. Simultaneously, she’s showing Chinese officials through private channels that she's still interested in keeping the relationship functional. It's a strategy that allows her to look strong domestically and internationally without completely burning bridges with Japan's largest trading partner.

It’s a gamble that only works if China decides that quiet diplomacy is better than a loud apology, and so far Beijing has proven unwilling to play ball.

The final lesson from this conflict, according to the Washington Post, is on the importance of strategic ambiguity.

In an editorial, the Post argued that despite the apparent benefits gained by making an explicit statement, Takaichi would have been better served by maintaining the same strategic ambiguity as her predecessors. The editors point to Trump’s ambiguity on how the U.S. might react in the event of an invasion of Taiwan as a model for Tokyo to follow. In their view, Trump, despite his usual guns-a-blazing approach to diplomacy, recognizes that stakes with China are too high, and there is no need to antagonize them.

As they put it, “Deterrence doesn’t require unneeded provocation. With China, carrying a big stick is always better than speaking loudly.”

Whether Takaichi's approach proves more effective than strategic ambiguity remains an open question. For now, the Prime Minister has made her position clear, and all the world can do is watch as this diplomatic crisis unfolds.

Sources

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