What Next For the Gen Z Spring?

How do you measure success?

That is the question that millions of young people around the world will be trying to answer after the Gen Z springs of 2024/2025 led to the ouster of several unpopular governments in Africa, Asia and even Europe. And even in the countries where they didn’t force their leaders out, Gen Z managed to secure major concessions from their governments.

Neither of these were easy feats, especially because most governments saw the protests as existential crises that required a very heavy handed response.

So, at least by those metrics, most of the protests weren’t just a success, they were a resounding success.

But, now that the batons have stopped swinging, the teargas has stopped billowing, the protest songs are no longer being sung, and the One Piece flags have been stowed away hopefully to be used at the next anime convention, the question of success demands a different answer.

Because, while protests are an important tool for a population to express itself, nation building doesn’t happen on the streets. The fundamental grievances that forced hundreds of thousands out of their homes and into running battles with the police can’t be resolved through demonstration alone.

It will require Gen Z to evolve from purely protesters to people who can effectively run governments.

And time is running out. Because most countries affected by the Gen Z spring will be heading to the polls within the next two years.

At stake? The soul of a revolution. Here’s how things are panning out in some of the key countries.

Bangladesh

On Thursday, the 12th of February, Bangladesh will head to the polls for the first election since the ouster on the 5th of August 2024 of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who had ruled the nation for more than 15 years before a month-long protest led to her removal.

During her rule, elections were primarily seen as a vehicle to cement her grip on power as the opposition either had their leaders arrested or chose to boycott them entirely. As a result, most voters simply chose not to engage with the elections. 27-year-old Rafiul Alam told Al Jazeera that despite becoming eligible to vote nearly a decade ago, he had not participated in any elections.

To quote, “My vote had no real value (...) You grow up knowing elections exist, but believing they actually don’t have the power to decide anything. So you put your energy elsewhere… studies, work, even trying to leave the country.”

And he wasn’t the only one. Humayun Kabir, director general of the Election Commission’s national identity registration wing, told Al Jazeera that everyone who turned 18 after the 2008 parliamentary election has never had the chance to vote in a competitive election. The oldest among these are in their mid-30s and the youngest will have just turned 18 before the final voter list was published on the 18th of November.

According to data from the electoral commission, there are 56 million such voters (between 18 and 37) and they make up about 44% of the electorate.

While not an outright majority, they represent a significant number of votes, and every party will be trying to court them.

According to nearly all opinion polls, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), one of only two political parties to lead Bangladesh alongside Hasina’s Awami League, is in the lead.

During Hasina’s rule, the BNP saw thousands of its members arrested, including former Prime Minister the late Khaleda Zia, who had been charged with corruption. Her son, Tarique Rahman, who was in self-imposed exile in the UK since 2008 and only returned after the protests, is the party's leader and widely expected to be the nation’s next Prime Minister should the BNP win.

The BNP is in the lead because of three reasons. First, it has a wide base of support from its time in power, which managed to remain stable despite Hasina’s best efforts. Second, it has rebranded itself as a liberal democratic force and the only party capable of bringing not just economic reforms, but also national healing that can help the country move past its many divisions. Third, the complete implosion of the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP).

Formed in the aftermath of the protests, the NCP was widely expected to play a major role in the post-Hasani future. However, despite positioning itself as a fresh alternative promising transparency, accountability, and an end to dynastic politics, the NCP failed to win over the general public who saw them as too inexperienced to properly lead the country. Internally, the party was facing cracks because of its treatment of women, it is only fielding 2 female candidates out of 30 in the upcoming elections. It was also fracturing because of a controversial alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party that, according to the BBC, has always been dogged by allegations that some of its politicians collaborated with the enemy during Bangladesh's 1971 war of independence from Pakistan.

According to Thomas Kean, a senior consultant at the International Crisis Group, having realized that they faced significant losses at the polls, NCP set out to create a bidding war between the BNP and Jamaat, which the latter won by offering more seats to the NCP. While this might guarantee a greater number of seats in parliament, Kean argues that it could prove a hindrance in the long term; the party risks being seen as a Jamaat affiliate rather than an entity in its own right. Second, according to Asif Shahan, a professor at the University of Dhaka, the alliance gave Jamaat the veneer of liberalism, while diluting the NCP’s centrist ideology, which in his view, was already poorly defined.

Finally, the NCP’s collapse cements a more cynical reality about Bangladeshi politics- that despite all the calls and clamouring for change, the country’s politics will always be dominated by the same establishment voices.

Despite the BNP’s claims that it is the only force capable of transforming and healing the nation, there are those within Bangladesh who believe that the BNP and the Awami League are two sides of the same coin. Recent conflicts over candidate selection will have reinforced that idea.

The youth will either have to work within these parties and try to push for change from within, or wait for the old guard to give up their spots at the helm, which is looking less unlikely with each passing day.

Whatever the outcome of Bangladesh’s elections on Thursday, one thing is clear: while the revolution may have ousted Hasina’s government, it didn’t fundamentally reshape the country’s political trajectory. At least not to the degree that most of the protesters had hoped for.

As Sadman Mujtaba Rafid told Reuters, “We dreamt of a country where all people regardless of gender, race, religion would have equal opportunity. We expected policy changes and reforms, but it is far away from what we dreamt of.”

Nepal

To the north, in Nepal, the situation couldn’t be any more different as the country gears up for elections in March. Nepal ousted its leader in September 2025 after protests against a government ban on social media platforms including Discord, Facebook and WhatsApp. The protests, which led to the deaths of 76 people, quickly escalated into wider complaints against government failures including nepotism and corruption.

Unlike Bangladesh where one leader dominated the country’s politics for the past 15 years, Nepal has struggled with political instability for decades. Since 2008, the country has seen 14 different governments, not one of which has completed a full five-year term. Which means that a lot of the inherent advantages that older parties in Bangladesh enjoyed, while present in Nepal, aren’t as pronounced.

Something else that sets the two nations apart is that in Nepal, the youth weren't part of the caretaker government led by 73-year-old former chief justice Sushila Karki. The interim administration was formed by more experienced voices.

While this meant the youth couldn't implement their ideas and wishes immediately, it spared them the early disappointments that plagued the founding members of Bangladesh's NCP. Without ministerial positions to defend or policies to implement, youth leaders avoided the compromises and missteps that come with wielding actual power. This distance has helped preserve their moral authority heading into the March elections.

Additionally, rather than forming their own parties, several prominent youth figures have instead joined the Rastriya Swatantra Party, a relatively young party formed in 2022.

Among them is Balendra Shah, widely seen as the de facto leader of the uprising and former mayor of Kathmandu.

Shah's entry into the RSP has set up what The Diplomat calls the most anticipated contest of the election: a direct showdown with former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli in Jhapa-5, a constituency that Oli has dominated for years. The 73-year-old leader was the face of the government during the uprising, and his resignation is what led to the situation the country currently finds itself in.

A victory for Shah, who is for all intents and purposes walking into Oli's political fortress and declaring he intends to take it, would establish him as the undisputed prime ministerial candidate and deal a symbolic blow to the old guard. But if Oli can hold his ground against the younger challenger, it would demonstrate that experience and political machinery still matter more than revolutionary credentials, potentially reviving his fading political fortunes.

Shah isn't the only youth leader to join the RSP. Sudan Gurung, the founder of Hami Nepal who emerged as one of the central negotiators during the transition, has also aligned himself with the party. With these new members, the RSP seems to have wind in its sails, although the Diplomat points out that predicting poll results remains difficult.

Despite this uncertainty, one thing is clear, that it will be difficult for any party to secure an absolute majority given Nepal's mixed electoral system, where 165 seats are contested through direct elections and 110 through proportional representation. The next parliament is likely to be another divided house, continuing the pattern of coalition governments that have defined Nepali politics since 2008. Still the RSP, which won 21 seats in their first elections in 2022, could conceivably emerge as the largest party in parliament by capitalizing on the Gen Z tailwinds. This will mean that they are the best placed to form a coalition government, although doing so would require cutting deals with the very establishment parties their supporters want to displace.

Whatever government emerges from the March elections will inherit a myriad of challenges that, if unresolved, could lead to further protests. The country’s economic growth is expected to slow down to 2.1% in 2026 from 4.65% in 2025. Youth unemployment is still a major challenge, forcing a lot of young Nepalis to leave for work in the Gulf states, Malaysia, or India, often under exploitative conditions. The incoming government will need to grow the economy and prove to these young Nepalis that they don’t need to go abroad to find opportunities if it is to succeed.

Kenya

Kenyan Gen Z will be watching the elections in Bangladesh and Nepal carefully, as the East African nation will be heading to the polls in 2027, giving them time to plan and learn from their Asian counterparts.

Kenyan Gen Z might face the hardest battle of all. After all - unlike those in Nepal and Bangladesh - the Kenyan Gen-Z revolution ultimately failed. President William Ruto remains in power, despite widespread backlash to what Kenyans saw as overtaxation, and his government excesses including the abduction and killing of protesters. During the 2024 protests, 50 people were killed and more than 200 injured. In 2025, a further 65 people were killed and more than 500 injured during subsequent protests.

Despite this violence, the president remains the frontrunner in most polls. His main opposition figures carry significant baggage. Former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua, who was impeached in October 2024, is widely viewed as a tribalist after his repeated focus on Mount Kenya regional interests. Former Interior Cabinet Secretary Fred Matiangi, is haunted by excesses of the Uhuru government, including extrajudicial killings and disappearances that marked that era.

The leaders that Gen Z actually admires face a different challenge altogether. Money. Former Chief Justice David Maraga, who famously annulled the 2017 presidential election, has built his campaign around grassroots fundraising. According to reports, he has raised about 7.7 million Kenyan shillings (approximately $60,000) from over 1,800 supporters, with the majority coming from Kenyans in the diaspora. This is nowhere near the estimated 7 billion shillings (roughly $54 million) that Nandi Senator Samson Cherargei, a close ally of President Ruto, claims is required to run a competitive presidential campaign in Kenya. Senator Okiya Omtatah, another figure popular with young Kenyans for his anti-corruption litigation, has similarly struggled to build a national profile against candidates with deeper pockets.

The death of Raila Odinga in October 2025 eliminated what could have been Ruto's biggest challenge. Although Raila had joined Ruto's government in a broad-based arrangement following the protests, his passing leaves a vacuum in Kenyan opposition politics. The political pact he signed with Ruto had already divided opinion among his supporters, but his influence and ability to mobilize voters across ethnic lines was unmatched. Without him, the opposition remains fragmented.

Still, young Kenyans refuse to concede defeat. Gen Z groups have been organizing voter registration drives across the country, pushing each other to register despite widespread disillusionment. They are also encouraging each other to run for office themselves, from county assembly seats to parliament, rather than waiting for established politicians to offer change. Whether this grassroots energy can translate into electoral success against Ruto's well-funded political machine and entrenched party structures remains to be seen. But for a generation that forced a president to withdraw a finance bill and reshuffle his cabinet, 2027 represents their chance to prove that street power can become ballot box power.

Madagascar

And finally there’s Madagascar, which might represent the single greatest betrayal of Gen Z’s goals of any protest movement so far. Madagascar’s youth took to the streets in September 2025, initially protesting against frequent water and power outages, but like in every country with a Gen Z spring, the protests soon evolved into a condemnation of the government’s broader failings.

While the youth initially celebrated when the elite CAPSAT military unit defected and joined their protests on October 11, it quickly became evident that the military had its own agenda. Colonel Michael Randrianirina wasted no time consolidating control after the president fled the country.

According to the Economist, most members of the administration Randrianirina formed had ties to the old guard, and some to individuals suspected of corruption. One Gen Z leader, Olivia Rafetison, told the outlet that the new administration looked like a mixture of several old ones, with the president trying to please every political party. A few protest leaders have received token positions. Baba Faniry Rakotoarisoa, who had protested alongside the youth and lost his job at Air France, was appointed to lead Madagascar's civil aviation authority in December.

But these were exceptions rather than the rule.

A key challenge for the Malagasy youth, according to anti-corruption campaigner Dr. Ketakandriana Rafitoson, is its horizontal structure. While this had been key to its ability to scale fast and resist repression, it limited its ability to influence policy, especially because the youth struggled to speak with a common voice. The leaders of one group, Gen Z Ankatso, which had been the most powerful force in drawing people to the streets, felt like they were being sidelined by other groups, including Gen Z Madagascar, whose organisers were a little older and more likely to come from wealthy families.

Another challenge is that some politicians hired their own Gen Z, many of whom are desperate for money, to make it look like they have the support of the youth.

While Colonel Randrianirina did promise to set up a youth parliament, most of the country’s young people feel like he doesn’t take the youth seriously. Additionally, as CIVICUS pointed out, there are fears that he might fail to hold elections after two years as previously promised, once again making Madagascar a military dictatorship.

All of this taken together paints a picture of a movement that has been thoroughly coopted, and, despite the ouster of the former president, is the furthest thing from the protesters’ initial ideas.

Although an outlier, Madagascar represents the most extreme example of what happens when a youth protest is co-opted. However, it doesn’t take a military takeover for the movement to lose everything it fought for.

Sometimes, all it takes is for the leaders to compromise with an unpopular party, or for the public to vote in the same people who were previously ousted.

Revolutions are fragile, and so are their souls. And while not every Gen-Z revolution sputtered out, many of these are likely to act as a warning to future protesters.

Sources

• https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/1/20/bangladeshi-youth-toppled-hasina-now-they-could-decide-next-prime-minister
• https://archive.is/Vrh9H
• https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/why-bangladeshs-elections-will-echo-far-beyond-its-borders/
• https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/15/africa/kenyas-raila-odinga-has-died-intl
• https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/114322-cherargei-mocks-maraga-over-fundraising-2027-bid
• https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/nepals-post-uprising-elections-take-shape/