Due South Episode 01

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good evening, good afternoon, whenever and wherever you're listening to us wrong. This is the very first episode of the Deuce Out podcast and I am your host, Wilfred Mainawi-Miri. I am the Africa correspondent for Warfronts, Homefronts, and basically everything Fronts.co related.

Thank you so much for joining us for our pilot episode. Now, here's a little bit of trivia that I will probably ask you on the anniversary of our 100th episode, but this was not meant to be the very first episode.

I actually spent most of yesterday recording and editing the first episode, the first official episode, which was going to be focused on Sudan based on an interview that I did with Sudan's ambassador to Kenya, but I got overtaken by events. Keep getting reminded of that very famous saying that time waits for no man.

So for the very first episode, we're going to talk about the only thing that anyone in geopolitics is talking about what happened in Iran. And that's basically all I can say.

At Warfronts HQ, we determined pretty long ago, immediately after the attack in Venezuela that captured President Nicolas Maduro, in fact, that the US and Israel were going to take some sort of action against Iran.

We didn't know when it was going to be, but we figured that it was going to be soon enough that our Saturdays were basically going to be given up for the foreseeable future. And we were very, very willing to give them up. Don't get us wrong. We chose this life and we wouldn't have it any other way.

So because I am in Kenya and in GMT plus three, basically about 30 minutes behind Tehran time, I was on call today to write the episode on Iran in case anything happened. My colleagues Evan and Kyle will take over later in the day, you know, all at least, in theory, enjoy our weekends. But then the strikes happened at about 8am in the morning.

And It's all I've been thinking about since. I have written an episode, basically a breaking news episode that will go out later today. Today being the 28th of February, 2020-26. I keep saying 2020-26 when I know it should be 2026. I'll say that again. I've written an episode that's going out later today. Today being the 28th of February, 2026.

And that episode basically covers everything we knew up until 2 p.m. Central European time and about 4 p.m. Kenyan time, 4.30 p.m. Irante. We covered where Israel and the U.S. are targeted in the strikes. We also covered the reaction by foreign powers. Noting specifically the reactions of three nations, which I refer to as interesting.

First, the U.K. Although the U.K. was very adamant in their support of the strikes, they made it clear that we were not involved. Westminster wasn't involved. And I found that interesting because normally, the U.S. and the U.K. are very attached at the hip when it comes to foreign policy decisions.

So, if the U.K. was making a point that we weren't involved, that indicates to me that they don't want to be drawn any further into this war than is absolutely necessary. Second, we noted the reaction from Russia with Dmitry Medvedev calling out the U.S. for using negotiations as a pretext to prepare themselves for strikes, for war.

And don't get us wrong, we're very pro-NATO, we're very pro-West. But that is a genuine point that we have to discuss. Because during the 12-day war, the U.S. did the exact same thing. Use negotiations as a buffer to get ready for strikes. And again, that's something we just saw.

Use negotiations as a buffer, build up your military presence in the Middle East, and launch strikes. So, it brings to question America's trustworthiness when negotiating deals. And we won't be the only ones asking these questions. In the future, in any future conflict, should Washington be a mediator? Should Washington be on the other side of the table?

People will be questioning whether those negotiations are legit. And I don't think Washington wants that.

When you're negotiating a deal, you want people to be able to take you for your war, to be able to take you for your war. you add your word and trust what you say you don't want any element of doubt to be introduced at any point it's it's very scary to think about but that's the nature of the beast that's the nature of the game we're playing it is what it is

In that episode we also discussed what we didn't know and one thing i really really want to talk about i mentioned it briefly in that script but the potential refugee crisis should a wider war occur i just finished writing an hour-length piece on haiti and haiti is in the grips of one of the worst humanitarian crises in the western world and that has been

Caused by decades and decades of gang violence which really culminated only a few years ago and that's when it hit its peak that's when people really started fleeing the country and it's caused one of the most i don't even have the right word at the moment i'm sorry i'm i'm a writer you know this is my first time recording a podcast on my own but it's caused

One of the gravest refugee crisis in the western hemisphere same with venezuela having an unstable government typically leads people to flee not just looking for better economic conditions but also looking for safety we saw that with syria when syria collapsed there was a massive massive refugee crisis so with the strikes if it had escalated into an even

Broader war which all signs are indicating that it might then we might be looking at one of the biggest refugee crisis in recent history and i am genuinely worried given the anti-refugee sentiment anti-immigrant sentiment that has cropped up in the west about what will happen to the iranian refugees and not just iranian refugees if this war spills over into

Other countries they'll have their own refugee crisis as well so again just something worth thinking about as we watch what is playing out today after after writing today's episode there were a lot of questions still linger this is a rapidly evolving situation we don't know what tomorrow will look like we don't even know what a few hours from today will look

Like so given that uncertainty i reached out to one of the top middle east experts within my network, someone I have spoken with at length, someone whose expertise I absolutely adore, I absolutely value, Professor Rockford White from the Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

He is a professor of practice and director of the Maritime Studies Program. Professor White and I first got to speak when the Venezuela crisis happened and I had to do another emergency episode on it. Basically I've been on emergency episode duty this entire year. Professor White is without a doubt one of the top experts I have had the chance to speak with.

He has spent 30 years stabbing the Middle East and Iran in particular and I think that gives him unique specific insights that almost nobody else has. So we got to speaking about two three hours ago, recorded that call and you'll get to hear it in the next section of the podcast.

It's actually going to be the bulk of the podcast, my conversation with the professor. And in that we discussed a lot of the unknown questions that I couldn't address in the introductory script. First, what happens in case Kamini dies?

Because as you hear in the section of the interview, there were a lot of conflicting reports that Kamini was dead and these were reports coming from Israeli reputable sources and from the Iranian government, there were reports that Kamini was alive and well and even Reuters reported that Kamini was expected to address the nation.

Now, at the time of recording this podcast, he is yet to address the nation. I don't know if he will address the nation by the time you hear it, but pretty soon we should have a really good idea of what the situation is with Kamini and what comes next. There are some within Iran who would obviously support the president.

The nation's president is a former sergeant, a doctor, cardiologist. He is a reformer. He is someone who isn't as hardline as some of the other figures within Iran's government.

But there were recent reports from the New York Times and I raised this with a professor about the Ayatollah basically blessing Ali Larjani, who is one of the nation's top national security figures. as former IRGC commander, basically anointing him with the power to rule Iran during this crisis. So there are two power bases within Iran.

The president's camp, which is the reformers, people who want to move Iran forward into the future, and the hardliners, the Lajanis and co, who, as it means to suggest, they're hardliners. They, again, they're hardliners. They take the harshest possible stance. They view America negatively. They view Israel negatively.

They're just very, what's the word for it? They're hardline individuals. So we talk at length about that. But we also discuss several legal questions, specifically on the legality of the strikes.

I got a comment earlier today from one of the experts that I have access to, a respected individual in geopolitics, who questioned the legality of the strikes because international law doesn't acknowledge them.

But one thing I've come to learn, and I'm not an expert at international law, but international law doesn't really seem to face the Trump administration. It's not a consideration. It's not something that they are specifically worried about because who will take the risk of arresting a sitting American president?

Yeah, that honestly isn't much of a consideration for them. But apart from the succession and the matters of international law, Professor White and I also spoke at length about the impact this will have on trade, specifically on oil and gas. The professor is a former oil and gas industry professional.

And given his expertise in the maritime industry, he was the right person to speak with about this. So, I hope you enjoy the conversation that I had with the professor. I hope you stick around for future episodes of DSL. This is an emergency episode. And I would like to think we did the best we can within the limited amount of time.

We really wanted to get this out there so that people could not only hear what we had to say, but also hear what the professor had to say, given his expertise, his knowledge, and just his regional understanding.

So, I will let Wilfred from a couple of hours take it away. and the professor they will take it away thank you so much hope to see you in the next episode bye-bye hi ladies and gentlemen my name is Wilfred Miner I am the Africa correspondent for Warfront Homefront Trance.co and basically everything France related and I am here with Professor Rockford Waits

From Taft Professor please introduce yourself I believe you can do a much better job than I sure no problem yeah Wilfred thank you so much it's great to be here so yeah Rockford Waits and I'm at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy where I am director of the Maritime and Arctic Studies Program we just rebranded with the dean's permission

And here we are I you know for geopolitics I've been a commodities trader before in oil and natural gas I have a PhD from the Fletcher School where I work now I studied Lloyd's of London as a transnational actor in maritime security policies in Southeast Asia Malacca Straits region I also have a Harvard Law degree so I can navigate the international legal

Issues if you'd like me to and I've been studying Iran for actually over 30 years my key advisor in my undergraduate college at the College of William and Mary in Virginia was his name was Jim Bill and he was the American academic who predicted the Iranian revolution before it happened and so I've been studying Iran for 30 years and there's lots happening in

Iran I've also been to Venezuela and traded Orinoco heavy and so I visited Venezuela for two weeks in 1995 and these things are all connected which is I think something your podcast can bring to the world because obviously what happened on January 3rd where the United States created this huge really starts to shape the politics of 2026 with a incredible

Military victory over Maduro's regime now Maduro of course was weak but to have essentially showed that the Russian made air defenses the S-300s the S-400s weren't very good to fly 150 aircraft including helicopters in to take Maduro in under four hours and then come back no casualties the implications of that have now reached Iran but they've also reached

Russia and even China so anyway that's like a it's a it's a way of introducing myself but also some of the topics I've been thinking about this year so far at the Fletcher School I teach a maritime geopolitics class I teach law of the sea and then the fall I also do entrepreneurial leadership because I'm a serial entrepreneur by trade I've done a number of

Maritime-oriented tech startups, so here I am, and happy to answer any questions.

All right. Thank you, Professor. Now, listeners, just from hearing what Professor White has done, you can understand why he was my immediate choice for a first guest for the episode, talking about Iran.

So, Professor, let me give the listeners a brief rundown of what has happened so far, what we do know and what we don't, just in case anyone is unfamiliar with what has happened. Sounds great. On the morning of Saturday, the 20th of February, we all woke up to the news that Israel and the U.S. had struck Iran.

We got statements from President Trump and President Netanyahu, forgive me, Prime Minister Netanyahu, saying that the strikes will continue because Iran is an imminent threat and urging the Iranian people to rise up against their government.

So far, we know that there have been strikes in Iran targeting military institutions, intelligence institutions, Iran's missile capabilities, basically anything that America and Israel thought could pose a threat to their armies, their navies, and allies individual.

We have seen reports that the Ayatollah is dead, but Iranian state media is saying he had been moved from Tehran way before the attacks began. We also have reports that the Iranian president is currently safe in a secure location. So that's what we know at the moment.

What we don't know, again, is whether the Ayatollah is safe because we've received conflicting reports about his safety with Israeli sources saying that he's been taken out while taken out or at the very least really injured. And Iranian sources again insisting that he is safe, he's okay, and there's nothing to see there.

So, Professor, let's start by talking about the negotiations that were happening between Israel, between Israel and the U.S., and what Oman's foreign minister said on Friday on American TV. I believe it was on CBS saying that a deal was imminent.

In the wake of this attack, Dmitry Medvedev from Russia said, and rightfully so, that America has used negotiations to build a buffer time in order to get assets in the region to prepare for an attack, which, again, is basically what had happened last year. So what do you assess as the likelihood of negotiations coming back online after all these strikes?

Yeah, great question. So I think it really is. So hard to answer because that's it's a great question and we'll maybe be able to answer it in a couple of days. But I think it's very hard to answer now. And the reason for that is it really depends how successful those strikes are.

So if the strikes take out the Ayatollah and the senior leadership of Iran, the president of Iran is an interesting character. He's a he's a reformer. So, you know, he might be a transitional leader. Maybe, you know, the it's an interesting question. So let's do two scenarios so that I cover it.

So say the regime survives that or at least, you know, some of the regime survive the senior leadership. So whether the Ayatollah does or not or the but if as long as either the Iranian president or the Ayatollah survive or both, then there's a pretty clear line of succession.

So, as you may know, Khomeini, the founder of the first Ayatollah supreme leader who started this current regime, launched it with the Iranian revolution in 1979. When he passed away, his president, Khomeini, who was the current supreme leader, was promoted up. And so there is a succession plan.

And I think the Iranian president would be the likely successor if it's Khomeini is has been taken out or seriously injured and may pass away. We'll see. So in that scenario, in theory, depending on what the overtures were from the Iranians, you could see a reengagement of the negotiating team from the Trump administration. So that's scenario one.

It could happen and it would probably be a bit more of a hardball negotiation on the issues that they. So that there are three big issues that the U.S. has presented in these negotiations. One is Iran's nuclear capability, which U.S. wants to put an end to that with some credible assurances. It's hard to do, but that's number one goal.

Second is some kind of arrangement. I don't know if it would be formal arms control, but some kind of mitigation of the missile assets of Iran, the ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that they and even maybe hypersonics that they either buy or develop themselves and the drones.

And third would be the proxy groups like the Houthis and Hezbollah and essentially negotiating to get the Iranians to back off of that of those of supporting those groups. So that's one scenario.

Another scenario would be that the regime is largely taken out and some kind of transitional figure emerges, much like what happened in Syria after Bashar al-Assad's regime fell, that a new leader emerges, that leader may or probably will not be. really, like, pro-Western or pro-American, but will be different and probably more forward-thinking than the

Current regime, which is, frankly, like, not doing well on governance.

I mean, Tehran's about to run out of water, which hasn't happened, I think, in 2,000 years, so it's a pretty bad failure of basic services.

And then, of course, the economy's terrible with the sanctions, and I know I have a lot of friends in the Persian expat community here in the United States and also in Europe, and they tell me, because they still travel back to Iran a lot, that the population has been very frustrated with this regime on multiple levels, sending a bunch of money to these

Proxy groups, which then essentially failed, so no return on investment.

It was a lot of money that was sent to Hezbollah and the Houthis and Hamas, and essentially that investment in those proxy groups failed. People essentially say in Iran, well, why don't you just spend on us? We're poor, and instead of fighting these proxy wars, number one.

Second is the missile technology is important, and the drone technology is important, and Iran has credible forces there. Those forces are being taken out kind of every hour by hour with this campaign, so those, I think, will be quite suppressed.

And so maybe it would be easier to agree to some limits on drone warfare and missile warfare if essentially your ammunition has been destroyed through military action. And then when you get to the nuclear issue, which of course is a major issue, I mean, we're not invading North Korea for a reason. It went nuclear and it has a nuclear deterrent.

And we've been very proactive. It's been bipartisan to prevent a nuclear power emerging in the sort of MENA region, Middle East, North Africa. So Libya in 2011 under Obama, you know, taken out as he was thinking about having nuclear weapons, and he then gave them up.

And then he was taken out, and that was a signal to the Iranians that maybe they should accelerate their nuclear program. And then you had the JCPOA, which was a negotiation really just focused on the nuclear nuclear issue with a number of European countries, plus China, plus the United States.

Trump pulled out of that and wanted to essentially negotiate a new deal that included missile restrictions as well as proxy warfare restrictions. And that negotiation never really materialized into anything.

And then we had, I mean, we're kind of seeing a continuity of the Trump administration's willingness to act against the leadership of Iran, the military leadership, as well as the... political leadership. So in the first administration, they took out Soleimani, who's the highest ranking military official in Iran.

And the Iranians retaliated by attacking some of U.S. bases in the region. This is a much, much, much bigger attack, even compared to the 12-day war, which happened last year to take out the nuclear facilities of Iran, was much more limited in this.

This is also significantly more force than either Gulf War I in 1991 or Gulf War II in 2003, and certainly more than Afghanistan. There's a lot of firepower assembled in the Middle East. It's really the largest since at least 1991.

And the real difference between 1991 and now is that the weaponry is more powerful, more sophisticated, because it's been 30 years. And 35 years, actually. So now another difference in character is we did not assemble a major land force to invade Iran and sort of march into Tehran. I don't think that's even on the table, not under consideration by anybody.

It would be unpopular with Trump himself, unpopular with Trump's base, unpopular with Democrats. I don't know who it would be popular with.

And so instead, the U.S. is using air power, naval power, cyber power, and special forces to, so there are probably some boots on the ground, but they're really there temporarily in the traditional, like, special forces role, not looking to occupy. And we have launched a tremendous number of missiles and bombs into Iran in just the last few hours.

And so that is degrading the military capability of Iran further.

And I think I'll leave one last point for our discussion, which is I think this is a very challenging military operation because they have to thread the needle of attacking just military targets and not undermining any protesters that emerge to try to overthrow the government and have a new regime. Whatever that looks like, it's quite unclear.

But instead, really focus on, I think they've already done it. I've seen multiple sources have said essentially the Iranian Navy is now on the bottom of the Persian Gulf. I think there might be some small boats to be able to still do some kind of counter-insurgency operations and maybe mine laying.

But their larger naval ships are on the bottom of the Persian Gulf. I think their submarines are probably taken out. So the Iranian Navy essentially doesn't exist anymore, much like the Venezuelan Navy doesn't. I think the Air Force is probably gone. Most of the air defenses are probably really certainly diminished if not taken out. a lot.

And now they're targeting land bases. I mean, they targeted the Supreme Leader's compound, his office, the president's office and home. The military leaders and major bases were targeted. And this is not over. I mean, I've heard credible sources say this is going to go on for three or four days.

I would say it certainly is going to last for two days, maybe four days. Might last for weeks, unlikely to last for months. And then the question becomes, what's next? The day after questions. I'll stop there. I put a lot on the table. So react to that and we can continue the conversation. Can you guys hear me? Oh, there he is. Hello. We've got you back.

I am so sorry you had some internet issues. Yeah, don't worry. So maybe repeat your last question about who the Ayatollah prefers. And I guess we didn't copy all of it, but it's a good question. I could tell it was a good question. So maybe just repeat it and I'll try to answer it. All right. Let me take it from the top.

There's been reports from the New York Times primarily that the Ayatollah prefers Ali Larijani. He's the country's top national security official. He's a former commander of the IRGC. He's basically a decorated veteran of Iran's national security apparatus. And from what I'm seeing about him, he seems like a hardliner.

So the reporting from the New York Times basically said the Ayatollah has given him run of the country for the time being.

And as we mentioned previously, the president is a reformer, which isn't necessarily popular with the Iranian government at the moment, considering how much pressure and, you know, the strikes, obviously, how much pressure Israel and the U.S. is putting on them.

So what do you think about Larijani and that idea that the Ayatollah might be willing to circumvent the traditional hierarchy, the traditional chain of command with him in charge? Yeah, I think that's very interesting reporting. And I think there's there's probably a lot there in the sense that I do. So the Ayatollah is certainly not a reformer.

I would be much more inclined to support Larijani, the National Security Council candidate. Now, that being said, it's still early days in this conflict. So I think what, you know, what could happen is a plausible scenario is that Larijani and many others in the military establishment get essentially taken out during the bombing campaign.

And it would be interesting to know. I don't know. I don't have any inside information on this, thankfully, which lets me do this podcast. I live in the unclassified world by choice. But in theory, if the president, who's a reformer, is.

The most senior person standing at the end of the bombing, that would probably be the best opportunity to work with somebody within the regime. And so that could very plausibly be a goal of the current strikes against the regime would be to take out some of these more nationalistic leaders who would be uncompromising, but younger than the Ayatollah.

Ayatollah is aging. I like to joke with my class that the Ayatollah in Iran is one of the few leaders that makes Joe Biden look young, right? So it's an aging regime. So yeah, we shall see. I've been studying the Middle East for over 30 years, including Iran in particular.

And I'll just say this about succession in both Arab countries and Iran, which is very complicated. And it's very unclear what actually happens until it happens. And so whether it's the United Arab Emirates or Iran, the succession plan tends to be a closely guarded secret by the senior leadership of each country and the royal family in the case of the UAE.

So it really is very hard as an outsider to predict exactly how the succession would work in Iran. Similarly, it's also difficult to even do it in a country as open as the UAE, which is really relatively open country for that Gulf Cooperation Council country.

So fundamentally, we're just going to have to wait and see because there's so much happening right now. We really are in the fog of war. It's very early days in this conflict. And I do think there will be several more days of bombing.

And once the bombs stop falling, that'll be the really interesting time to pay close attention to who in the Iranian regime is still standing, who might be flown in, maybe Pahlavi's son returning to Iran for the first time since 79. It's unclear if he has enough support domestically. And unclear is putting it pretty diplomatically.

The indicators look like he probably doesn't. He's very popular with the expatriate community, but kind of like Ahmed Chalabi and Iraq. Like if you're outside the country, you don't really have the connections inside the country to make an effective transition government.

So, you know, I think that Iran's an extraordinarily complex country, over 90 million people. It's 53% Persian. It's 15% Azerbaijani, 10% Kurd. Those two large minority groups, the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds, primarily... They reside in the west of Iran, and they're 25% of the population. They have some very influential geography.

They have essentially their own allies and partners with Azerbaijan supporting the Azerbaijanis and the sort of Kurds in Syria and other places in the Middle East supporting the Kurds, Syria, Iraq, and less so Turkey because of Turkey's campaign against the Kurds. But fundamentally, Iran, this—I listened to President Trump's video statement very closely.

I've listened to it three times, and he was—I think he's correct in saying that this is essentially a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the Iranian people to replace the current government, which has been in place since 1979, so it's been in place for 47 years.

And it's at a point where it's at its weakest since 1979, in part because of the 12-day war last year, but also because the proxies that it's invested so much in essentially have lost to the Israelis as the Israelis have retaliated after October 7th and after, like, the Houthi attacks on the commercial shipping.

So Iran's really on its back feet, the current regime, and they're having real domestic problems, like the water supply in Tehran and just—there's all kinds of real domestic problems, inflation. And if, you know, Americans complain about the inflation here, but it's nothing compared to the inflation there.

And so that sort of perfect storm of circumstances is now becoming much more complicated with the U.S. sending two carrier strike groups, F-22s, strategic bombers, you know, a lot of firepower to the region and using it in a big way. So we're just going to have to see.

I think the day after challenges, after the bombs stopped falling in Iran, are enormously challenging, much more challenging than the Venezuela ones, which are also challenging. So we'll see. I mean, and just to keep it global and complex, because these things, I think, are all related, we might see a new regime emerge in Cuba.

So at the same time, because Cuba's under tremendous economic pressure right now, with food shortages and electricity shortages, it's really quite remarkable. The axis of resistance is looking remarkably weak right now. Professor, let's save Cuba for another episode of the podcast. Sounds good. Just throwing it out there for fun. Yeah.

It's something I have been thinking about, because there were reports from Axios that Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State was meeting with a Castro family relative. I can't remember who at this exact moment to figure out a deal, a deal basically between the U.S. and Cuba. And yes, Cuba is immense pressure right now.

So yes, we'll come back to Cuba hopefully in a future episode and hopefully not in the middle of a Saturday when we both should be enjoying the deal a little bit, not worrying about the world's crises. But I want to go back to the idea of the pressures that are facing Iran at the moment, one.

And two, I want to speak a little about the proxy networks and the potential for causing damage. So within this week, we've seen the protests come back. We've seen a lot of the same areas where the protests were initially happening. We've seen them resume. We've seen students coming back onto the streets. But there was an assessment. Just give me a second.

Let me pull it up. There was an assessment by an Iranian analyst. Well, this was by Narjes Bajobli, an associate professor at Prince Hopkins, who said that the Iranian Republic has re-established control after the protest and showed no signs of immediate collapse.

And again, I have to emphasize that this was an assessment that was done before all the strikes that happened before there was a resumption in the protest. But do you think there will be enough local momentum to change the government? That's one of my burning questions. And this is a great question. Yeah.

Before we start off that one, it sounds like you got one more too. I do. I do. Okay. Answer that, then I'll ask. I'll answer that, then you can ask one more. All right. So I've been talking with a lot of my Persian friends, and I have a fairly extensive network of Persian friends here in Boston, but also in Los Angeles and also in London.

So admittedly, they're expatriates, so they live outside of Iran, but they do travel to Iran a lot. And they are the most optimistic for regime change that they've been since 79. Most of them are younger, actually, than 70. So they were maybe very young children in 79. But fundamentally, this has the best chance of a new regime in their lifetime.

And they're very excited about that because this regime is deeply unpopular with its own people, especially the people outside of the country.

But even within the country, the majority of Iranians, it seems, based on like a combination of kind of qualitative evidence as well as, I mean, you don't really want to, there are opinion polls in Iran, but they're not very reliable, I would say. So, you know, but it's many experts. So, you know, we're going to do this. So, you know, we're going to do this.

So, you know, we're going to do this. So, you know, we're going to do this. So, you know, we're going to do this. 12, 13, 14, 15, 14, 15, 15, 16, 16, 16, 17, 17, 18, 19, 19, 19, 19, 20. The Iranian populists indicate that the majority of Iranians are frustrated by this current government because it really is failing to develop the country economically.

There are between 20% and 40% of Iranians who are completely loyal to the regime because they depend on the regime for their living. So that makes everything very complicated, and that 20% to 40% also has more access to small arms and things that the government would give them to help maintain stability and keep itself in power. So we'll just have to see.

I will say the chance of a regime change in Iran that is domestic, so kind of from the bottom up, is higher today than at any point. The chance of it is higher today than any point since 1979, the revolution. So, you know, that says a lot, actually, but it's really unclear how this pans out. It's too early to tell. Now, what's your other question?

My other question was on Iran's proxies, which, as you've mentioned previously, the return on investment hasn't really been seen, given just how thoroughly the U.S. and Israel has been able to dismantle them. Specifically, I'm thinking about Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon now.

But that hasn't happened with the Houthis, and they put out a statement in the wake of the attack saying that they will be, basically, they will be resuming attacks on shipping lanes. And, you know, as a maritime expert, this is what happened. Yeah, amazing, Alec. Right in my wheelhouse, so to speak. Yeah. Exactly. This is in your wheelhouse.

So how big of a threat are the Houthis? And then I have one more question and an exclusive that Reuters just dropped. I'll tell you about it after you answer this. Okay. Ooh, sounds good. All right. So your analysis is correct. So Hezbollah significantly weakened. Still exists. Will some form of it will rise again, is rising.

But it's not as powerful as the Houthis. Hamas, definitely not as powerful as the Houthis right now. Both Hamas and Hezbollah have really been degraded in their capabilities. And the Houthis have been, too, but they're just far enough afield. They have the geography of Yemen on their side. They hide in the mountains.

And they, you know, they are a very interesting proxy group. It would be worthy of its own podcast just on the Houthis, frankly. But so the chance of them disrupting global shipping because of what's happening, the strikes currently happening against Iran, is high. They will respond in support of their essentially main backer. They will probably attack both.

If any ship with an Israeli connection and any ship with a U.S. connection, they'll probably still let the Chinese vessels through and a few other nations that are viewed as friendly and hands-off. But certainly the U.S. ships, including ships going to the U.S. that might, say, be Greek ships, those could come under attack. And then same for Israeli ships.

And that will be disruptive. And they've also fired on Navy vessels. So, you know, they will play a role here, I think. And for now, we'll just leave it at that. All right. And specifically, I'm thinking about the Strait of Hormuz. Yes. Could I get your comments on that? Of course. Yeah.

Well, I've studied the Strait of Hormuz for 25 years, and I have some articles on it in the publication of the conversation. So, the Strait of Hormuz is a very important maritime strategic choke point. In many ways, it's the most important for crude oil and liquefied natural gas, only really rivaled by the Strait of Malacca.

In both cases, what you're seeing is hydrocarbon exports through the Strait of Hormuz, which is only 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest, which is basically the width of Boston Harbor, to give a U.S. example, but is significantly more narrow than the English Channel, significantly more narrow than this Taiwan Strait.

And so, through the Strait of Hormuz, which has Iran to the north and Oman and the UAE to the south, passes the Navy ships that go into the Gulf. The Gulf is a disputed name. The Iranians like to call it the Persian Gulf, which is actually what most Americans call it. And the Arabs like to call it the Arabian Gulf. But for now, we'll just call it the Gulf.

So, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Gulf with the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. And essentially, all the oil that's... So, all the natural gas that's exported by Qatar to Pacific Asia passes through the Strait of Hormuz and then the Strait of Malacca and then the South China Sea and then either...

Usually, the Luzon Strait, but sometimes the Taiwan Strait, and gets to Japan and South Korea and China. Those are the three big importers of liquefied natural gas. And Qatar's the world's largest exporter, which is why it's the wealthiest country per capita in the world. They sit on the largest gas field on the planet that's shared with Iran.

So, that's number one, the LNG flows.

And then the crude oil flows from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the big one, the big exporter, and the UAE and others, are exporting through, mostly through the Strait of Hormuz, both the Saudis and the UAE have some ability to......to it. export by pipelines to get to either the Red Sea in the Saudi case or the Arabian Sea in the UAE case.

But essentially, tens of millions of barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz per day.

And that's why one of the risks that the Iranians can execute on would be not rebuilding their larger Navy ships, but using their small vessels to lay mines and really make it difficult for commercial shipping, as well as it complicate U.S. naval operations in the Strait of Hormuz. And that could have, they wouldn't be able to keep it closed for very long.

But even a short-term disruption, when you're talking about that important of an oil choke point, has global implications, would certainly raise oil prices globally. So I hope that helps put things in context. Yes, that was perfect and puts things in context.

And as you mentioned, the Strait of Hormuz is perhaps one of the most important margin and choke points for the oil and gas industry. Nearly 20% of the world's daily consumption passes through it. So again, something, definitely something to watch. So I want you to discuss off-ramps.

So there was a report from CNN earlier today that, as we said, Washington has planned this out to be a series of strikes with built-in off-ramps for Iran along the way with each passing strike. So do you think Iran will take these off-ramps? And what do you think they will look like? This is a really hard question to answer right now.

So it really depends who the leadership of Iran is, right? Which I think will be, is in flux for the next couple of days, maybe a few days. So let's assume that it's the current leadership that manages to survive. Well, they're going to be, they're unlikely to compromise.

Because part of why they're in this situation is, even though the headline from the Omani foreign minister was the deal was near, it really comes down to a question. And I'll kind of use my, my law background to ask what would sound like a law question.

If we're, you're saying you're close to an agreement, one, define close, you know, are you days or weeks or months away? I don't think they really know. I think there was progress, but, and the Omanis, of course, is the brokers are going to want to try to stand out for the peace process, not give up right away.

But it seems like the, that those efforts were, you know, not on track. We'll just leave it at that. Now, if there's Here we go. Let's do this. new leadership in Iran, that somebody more moderate is the last person standing and essentially takes over the country similar to what happened in Syria. Well, then I think negotiations really do come back.

And the U.S. probably is quite accommodating, similar to how we've been in Syria, to try to help pull Iran to be a little bit more pro-Western. Now, Iran is a very different country from Syria, a very different country from Venezuela. In both cases, significantly larger population, significantly deeper cultural roots that go back centuries.

So Iran is essentially the modern successor to the Persian Empire. And that's an ancient civilization. And they have a lot of pride about that. And they're very successful outside. The diaspora is a very successful diaspora. Outside of Iran.

And so what that shows is that if Iran had the right policies, that expatriate community could come back, live in Iran and prosper, which they would probably prefer to do, in part because for them, living in Iran is much cheaper. So really hard to say at this point, but very, very good questions, Alfred.

And I am looking forward to our next podcast session someday in the future. Yeah. Thank you, Professor. It's my job to have the questions and, you know, it's your job to have the answers, hopefully. All right. Bye. I hope they were interesting. I want you to keep your law hat on for just a minute longer. Okay, sure. I got a comment.

So I want to preface this with a little bit of an explanation so that the audience understands where this comment came from. All right. I'm ready. I use a tool called Quoted. That's actually how Katie and I connected. Quoted allows me access to a wide variety of experts, such as yourself, Professor, that I normally wouldn't have had access to.

So one of the experts that responded to my call for comments on Iran is James Stewart from Flagburg. James is a geopolitics expert. He is an extremely well-credentialed professional in geopolitics.

And his comment to me was that the strikes in and of themselves are illegal under international law, since there can be no claim to a direct threat to the U.S. But this is unlikely to bother the U.S. administration. So what do you think of that? I think that's mostly true.

So what I tell my students is that in international law, especially, every issue is gray. So what you're looking for is what's called a colorable argument. So a plausible argument that you have a legal argument to make. And I would say it's also why lawyers always speak in sort of problem. abilities, right?

So what's the majority opinion on this or a minority opinion on this? So I would say probably the majority opinion on these strikes against Iran is that they are not complying with international law because there's not a UN Security Council resolution supporting the use of force here. And there's also not really clear domestic law in the United States.

It's a different level of legal analysis. The international law is at the international level. The domestic law is at the federal level of the United States. And there has not been a sort of Iran war resolution that supports this domestically.

And there hasn't been any sort of international effort to cobble together a UN Security Council resolution to make this. And it would be unlikely to pass because either China or Russia could veto it. And so that's partially why the UN has been circumvented by this administration.

That being said, their argument, which would be a minority opinion argument, would be that Iran funds these proxies. They launch missiles at us. They're pursuing nuclear weapons. These are all threats to the United States. That since the Iranian Revolution, they killed hundreds of our Marines in Beirut.

They've targeted lots of our military bases in the region. Excuse me. And therefore, they present a threat to the United States. And that is the argument of the Trump administration. So they view it as a self-defensive move. But that is that is not without controversy. Thank you, Professor. That's I am not an international law expert.

I'm not even a law expert. My background is in economics and finance before I decided to make the hop on over to geopolitics. But I will defer to you on that. And because I know we're limited on time, I have two reports to discuss with you.

One, there's a report that I'm seeing from France 24 that the airstrikes killed at least 51 people at a girl's school in southern Iran. Yeah. And as you mentioned, there's about 40 percent of the Iranian people who are ardent supporters of the IRGC who will live, breathe and die by this regime.

So do you see that number increasing as tales of civilian carnage keep on coming out? Because I have a friend who has a friend. So again, friend of a friend who is saying that on the ground, there's been a lot of civilian casualties. But again, take this with a grain of salt. This hasn't been verified, which is difficult given the internet blackout in Iran.

But yes, with a large amount of civilian casualties, do you think the number of people who support the IRGC increases? Or is the regime so tainted that the public wouldn't rally towards it despite the large number of cuts? Yeah. So this is like a, this is a lawyer answer to this, but I think it's accurate.

It totally depends on the civilian casualties and the details. So the situation at that school looks very clear that was a accidental hit by the U.S. military. The U.S. military is trying very hard. I mentioned this earlier in our conversation.

They're threading this needle, trying very hard to just hit military targets, hit military bases, hit naval assets, air assets, sort of missile factories. And the case of this school, which the regime is making a lot of, which is not surprising, is one of an accidental casualty.

So they were not, they were not, you know, according to U.S. military, this was not on purpose. There have been a lot of push, there has been a lot of pushback on that saying it's even a propaganda piece. I can't tell. We won't, it's too early. This is the fog of war.

It's too early to tell what's actually fact and fiction and what's narrative versus reality. Very hard. It really impossible to do right now.

So I would just say that if there are significant casualties in the civilian population, particularly among protesters that are, that are accidentally killed with U.S. bombs, that will really undermine the ability of the United States to effectuate a regime change in a smooth and smart way.

So I think the U.S. military is trying really hard to not have that happen. And on the other side, I think the Iranian regime is looking to showcase any accidental, or they would just say any civilian casualties to show that the sort of big, bad Americans are beating on us again, come join us in the resistance. So it's too early to tell.

I do think given the number of bombs that have already fallen from what I've heard, I think it's kind of amazing just like how, how few civilian casualties have even been pushed out by the Iranian regime. So far, I think the military has been very successful, U.S. military, in minimizing civilian casualties, but that can always change.

Again, we're in early days and this is the fog of war. So what is your last question, Wilfred? My last question isn't necessarily a question, just a report from Reuters that broke literally as you and I were speaking. You and I talked about the possible successes to the Ayatollah Khamenei.

And, you know, we were talking about the possibilities that a hardliner would come in, into play if the Ayatollah died at any point. And the CIA had come. The exact same assessment according to this Reuters report. Let me read the headline. Exclusive prior to the Iran attacks, CIA assessed that Khomeini will be replaced by hardline IRGC elements if killed.

Sources

say. So, again, our initial assessment that hardline elements within the IRGC will take over seems to be correct. Wow. Yeah. So we shall see. You know, I mean, I think what I've learned studying the Middle East for 30 years is it is a place where it is very difficult to predict over the long term. For example, I would not have expected Syria's Bashar al-Assad to fall and to have a new regime in Syria that is embraced by Donald Trump. Neither of us would have been on my prediction card last year or the year before they happened. So I think we're just going to have to see. It actually makes it a very interesting region to watch always. It's super complicated. There's lots of regional rivalries. There's lots of diversity, ethnic diversity among the Arabs and the Turks and the other players in the region. So, you know, I think we're I think we're on track to have Iran continue being in the news for certainly the next couple of days, probably next few days and likely the next few weeks or months. Right. Thank you so much, Professor, for your time. Yeah. I wanted to ask if people were interested in hearing more of your analysis. Are you on Twitter? Are you on Facebook? Where can people find you? I'm on. So I'm on Twitter or X. I'm on LinkedIn and I'm on Facebook and Instagram. I'm not on anything else. I can only do three. That's the rule of three. I've been resisting adding Blue Sky or TikTok or others to this mix. So I stick with X, Facebook and Instagram because it's integrated and LinkedIn. And so. So, yeah, people are most welcome to follow me. It's Rockford W on X, Rockford White's LinkedIn as well as Facebook. I can also send you the links, Wilfred, so you have everything. Perfect. Thank you, Katie. And, Katie, thanks for arranging this. And, Wilfred, I must go. I need to take a break and I have to go buy a birthday present for my daughter's birthday party that I'm taking her to at 1 o'clock. So we're going to go do that. So I'll take a little break from the media hits. This was interview seven for me, actually, this morning. Thank you so much. Pretty amazing. Keep the good work. I'm very jealous that you got to sleep until 11 because. I woke up at 2, and I made the mistake of checking the news. Oh, my gosh. Yeah, so I'm trying to stay on Europe time anyway. I was on Norway time. I was in Norway and Finland last week and headed to Rome on Monday, returning on Thursday. So might as well just stay on Europe time and, you know, burn a little midnight oil to stay up until 7 p.m. My time in Concata. So, all right, well, thank you both. And we'll be in touch. And Wilf and Matrius, send us the link to your podcast once you launch it. Of course, Professor. And as always, thank you so much for your time. You and I are going to speak a lot more in the coming weeks and months. And if I have any questions, given, you know, that this is an evolving, rapidly evolving situation, I'll make better email you. Yes, please do. And copy Katie always because she helps me stay on top of things, which is helpful. And I don't know how much you follow the Chinese New Year, but the year of the fire horse started on February 17th. And it tends to be a very productive year for fire dragons like me. So, and it has been a busy year so far. So, we shall see. All right. Happy Saturday, friends. We'll talk to you soon. Have a good day. Bye. Happy Saturday. Thank you. Bye. Bye. Bye.