Middle East Roundtable: Strait Chaos.

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good evening, good afternoon, whenever and wherever you're listening to us from. This is the Middle East Roundtable with me, Wilfred Miner, and my co-host, Kyle Moran. Kyle, say hi to the people. Hello, everyone. Thank you for tuning in once again. And again, this is another week where it's just me and Kyle in the cockpit.

Our lovely moderator, Evan, is still in the street of Omos because, as you'll hear in today's podcast, there is a lot that is going on. And Kyle, take us away. Tell us what's happening in the street of Omos. It's been a wild news morning.

So there was rumors coming out, or a report rather, coming out of Axios that there were negotiations ongoing that would involve some form of deal ultimately being reached. There was a little bit back and forth in terms of what exactly this would include. A lot of it had to do with more Iran's longtime talking points.

They did make some concessions in terms of uranium enrichment in particular and an agreement to export that. But beyond that, there was nothing in terms of proxy forces or their ballistic missile programs.

The biggest poison pill that shortly thereafter came out is that they had created a website and launched a website that was titled the Persian Gulf Strait Authority. The website basically being a payment portal directly to the IRGC for passing through the strait. I have long maintained that is basically going to be a no-go for Washington.

And if it ends up being anything other than a no-go for Washington, that's a massive concession. Because this will legitimize Iran's claims of sovereignty over the strait, which has never been recognized by any previous administration or other countries as well. It's an international waterway.

And it will also embolden actors throughout the rest of the world to do this similar extortion campaign, where if you have a narrow body of water that a lot of ships pass through, well, lo and behold, you just found a gold mine. So as of right now, I think this deal is kind of off.

Trump is once again saying that it's too early for any of this to ultimately be reached. So we're going to have to see how this goes. But for the short term, at least, I'm settling in for another round of uncertainty, shall we say.

And that is where we're starting off our morning with Evan in the strait of Hormuz and me and Kyle looking at one of the most complicated news days we have seen in a very long time. Because as Kyle has mentioned, Axios had a very exclusive report. And this is from Barak Ravid.

And we're not, throughout this piece, we might disagree with Ravid's coverage, but we're not saying this to disparage him in any sort of way. This is more. professional disagreement more than anything else, because he is a really, really well-connected journalist, really does amazing work.

But Ravid had a report that the White House believed it's getting close to an agreement with Iran on a one-page memo, and Kyle has just detailed the memo. So I want to preface this with a statement that people have been very critical of Axios' coverage during this entire war.

This is from Syed Mohamed Marandi, who is a professor who is very close to the Iranian regime. He's one of the few people in Iran who is still capable of tweeting and reaching the wider world. He posted this on Twitter a little bit after the Axios report came out. Quoting him here, he said, Axios is a tool for the White House to manipulate the markets.

The Islamic Republic is fully prepared for a potential major attack before Trump's trip to China. And if that is the feeling within Iran, that Axios is a tool for the White House to push out its agenda, its view on things. It's a view worth considering, if only to see what the Iranians are thinking, what's the thinking within Tehran.

There's also another tweet I want to bring up. This is from Caitlin Donboss. She is the foreign policy and national security reporter for the New York Post. And she said that President Trump had told her it's too soon to start packing her bags for Islamabad after reports that the US and Iran are close to a peace deal. Quoting him here, it's too far.

No, it's too much. And he had previously told Donboss that he will go to Pakistan for a peace deal signing, but we're not there yet. So we're far from a peace deal in Iran, despite the best efforts of everyone who's on the ground and working towards a peace deal. And the oil markets have reacted to that really, really quickly.

In the immediate aftermath of the news that a peace deal was about to be struck, oil futures had gone down. And Greg Karlstrom, Middle East correspondent for The Economist, who's one of the funniest people I have seen on Twitter, he posted something that I think is really, really worth highlighting.

He said, God grant me the optimism of an oil trader reading headlines about a vague bullet point MOU that leaves the details to be resolved in further negotiations, which may end up collapsing or dragging on indefinitely.

And true to his words, the price of oil futures does. shot up almost immediately after caitlin's tweet and now they're they're back to the highs they had been before before all the talks of the peace deal happened so oil is still going to be expensive in the in the short term it's going to be a very expensive summer yeah that is where we're at kyle want to

Take it away absolutely yeah so on the iranian regime's excuse me journalist friends i find it a little odd that they're targeting non-regime media mohammed ghalibaf is literally tweeting market advice okay i mean he literally tweeted on march 29th heads up pre-market so-called news or truth is often just a setup for profit taking do the opposite if they

Pump short it if they dump it go long see something tomorrow you know the drill this had 16 and a half million views so the they're playing for the team the this is all this is they don't like what axios put out on that but i do think there was something genuine that was going on there in terms of a potential deal being discussed i think it may have been

They may have been a little out over their skis in terms of the likelihood but again to your point on oil traders confidence based off of a vague bullet point on an mou it doesn't take a whole lot to actually move these markets so we'll see where all of that goes but i think this can sort of transition us to a broader conversation about what's actually been

Going on in the region as a whole beyond just these vague bullet points and into a conversation about who's actually winning this who actually is losing this it would be impossible to have such a conversation without first addressing the strikes by iran the other day on the united arab emirates as an attempt by some analysts to either start the war again or

By others to separate the emiratis from the rest of the region wilford what are your thoughts on all of this what was iran thinking in doing this was this a mistake was this a wise play what's going on so as you mentioned iran construct the uae in what was what i initially assumed that you know would be considered a gross violation of the of the ceasefire

Because the uae is one of the one of america's key allies in the region there's a lot of american money packed in the uae has invested significantly in the u.s so i believed that this would be the one of, would be considered at least one of the biggest ceasefire violations, but from Iran's, sorry, not even from Iran's point of view, rather from America's

Point of view, they didn't consider it enough of a ceasefire violation to end talks with Iran and begin bombing strikes.

So from Iran's point of view, they have sort of a free hand to do as they please, and this goes to the heart of a piece in the Wall Street Journal that you sent to me earlier today saying Gulf countries are afraid that this war is making Iran feel a lot more emboldened, and that is what they're feeling.

They're feeling emboldened enough to conduct these strikes, and that America will not retaliate in any way, even if an ally as critical as the UAE, an ally that, you know, was discussing swap lines with the U.S. Treasury Department just the other day. Again, you don't discuss swap lines with Washington unless you're a very well-placed ally.

So the fact that the Iranian regime felt emboldened enough to attack is concerning, and the fact that there was virtually no response as a result is also very concerning. Sure. So especially to the Emirati side of things, it's completely legitimate for them to consider this a ceasefire violation, because on technicalities, it absolutely is.

The only potential factor that may go into making this less of an issue is on Sunday, the United States announced something called Project Freedom, which was going to be an attempt to escort vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, essentially bypassing the Iranian blockade.

It was not apparently going to have a formal U.S. naval escort, so we're not entirely sure of what exactly that would include. But either way, Iran was very clear that they considered that to be a ceasefire violation.

So essentially what they were doing with this is enforcing a red line that they have in order to stop any U.S. violation of it without violating the broader ceasefire. So essentially they were saying, if you don't bypass this, the ceasefire is still on. As of today, Project Freedom has been put on hiatus. I think it will make a comeback.

But the bigger picture here, beyond just Emirati concerns, which I am very sympathetic to, it is ultimately very unusual that retaliation for American campaign. just to escort vessels through an international waterway would result in Iranian attacks on Emirati locations.

But the broader picture here is the current status quo, as we discussed last week, in which the U.S. is not conducting epic fury, but rather economic fury, through the blockade of all Iranian ports, their ability to export oil is severely reduced, all of this type of stuff.

That gives the U.S. a slight upper hand, as opposed to what was going on during the war. So there's really no huge incentive from the American side of things right now to start bombing again. Because as we were seeing by the end of the bombing campaign, it was a very reduced ROI.

So sure, if you start bombing again, could you take out some more strategic targets? Of course. How much would that actually change the game? Not that much. Would then start spending a lot more money on weapons, as well as the interceptors that we're already very low on. We've had some extensive coverage of this over on war fronts.

So from an American perspective, starting up the campaign again is not in anyone's direct interest right now. It would be much better to simply wait this out. So if the Iranians start bombing or start launching again, in terms of trying to recreate the war, that would be one thing that requires a full retaliatory response.

But if it's simply a discussion of who's violating the ceasefire first, I don't see the U.S. being willing to act on that. Because, again, I just don't see it as being in the U.S. particular interest. But I am curious as to your thoughts on how legitimate that is, or if Washington is just trying to twist itself into a pretzel there.

I totally hear you, Kyle, on potential retaliation not being in America's best immediate interest, given the low ROI. And again, there's the issue of low interceptors, which, again, you covered really well on war fronts. Folks, please give it a watch if you haven't already.

But there's a phrase that the Iranian leadership has been really, really fond of repeating since the war began. And after the attacks on the UAE, they've been repeating it a lot more. And this is a phrase attributed to deposed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. It's in the Wall Street Journal. We'll include a link to that piece.

Those who wrap themselves in America are naked. It's a feeling that if you consider America your key strategic security partner, you're basically uncovered. And their hand. you are exposed to whatever harms exist. Because as the UAE has just learned, if it's not in America's immediate interest, it will not respond to an attack.

So the UAE has been attacked, its economy is struggling because of these attacks, and America has done little in response. So from that point of view, it might not be in America's short term, interest to respond to an attack on the UAE by Iran. But, and this is something that has been revealed over the course of this war. America does play favorites.

Everyone plays favorites. If this were Israel that had been attacked, America would have responded with a bigger show force because the relationship between America and Israel is vastly different from the relationship between America and Israel and the country.

There's a British official, I'm not exactly sure who it was off the top of my head, that said America's only special relationship, the final special relationship that exists, is its relationship with Israel.

So if this were Israel that had been attacked, America would have responded with a lot more force, with a lot more objection, than how it responded once the UAE was attacked. The question now becomes, what kind of message does that send to America's other allies in the region? Is it a case where if you wrap yourself in America, you're naked?

So it might not be in America's best short-term interest, but if America does want to continue being regional hegemon, regional superpower, regional security guarantor, and you're not just within the frame of, you buy weapons from us, and we give you a broad security guarantee, but that sort-out special relationship that every single country in the world is

Seeking out with America, I think it should have responded a lot more forcefully to these attacks.

I think that this Mubarak quote is just a reassertion of Realpolitik, because for much of the Cold War era, post-Cold War era, we have been in this thinking where an alliance means that national interest no longer exists.

So a lot of European defense has been built around this for much to current European leaders' chagrin, where a lot of it was just assumed, like, sure, the U.S. will infinitely be there for you. The problem with this is that just isn't how international relations has ever really worked.

You can have alliances based on shared national interests, but ultimately a nation is going to... put its own interests first. So you can only be so dependent on another country without risking your own national security. So the Emiratis have a very strong air force, by the way. They're more than capable of responding to this if they so choose.

The fact that they're not is indicative to me that they themselves are not willing to risk what they would prefer the U.S. to do instead.

And I do understand that being next door to Iran makes this slightly more challenging because Iran can easily, as they have shown over 2,000 times through over 2,000 strikes, hit the Emiratis in ways that they cannot on American domestic soil, at least.

But overall, the idea that the United States is going to simply put aside its own national interest in the defense of other countries, I don't think that's ever really been how this system was supposed to work. I think that some leaders and some foreign policy people had convinced themselves that it was.

And so over the last decade, we've really seen that sort of unravel itself as we return to a more country.

I'm not a hardcore realist myself, but I am somebody who recognizes that if your national defense is based on the expectation that the United States will just simply be there in perpetuity to bail you out, that is not going to be a solid defense strategy, shall we say. I disagree on that.

Specifically in the sense that it's not in America's national interest to defend the UAE in this particular instance. And it's wonderful that we are back to disagreeing within the very first topic of conversation on the podcast. There was way too much agreement last time. I was listening back to it. I mean, we were drinking way too much, my friend.

So America's interests go beyond, far, far beyond simply what is good for the American homeland. Because America has positioned itself in the post-Cold War era as the superpower, the go-to guy. When it comes to security, when it comes to providing protection to regimes around the world. And I concede, the UAE does have its own powerful air force.

It does have its own capabilities. And I don't have a comparison off the top of my head between its capabilities and that of Iran. But it's not so weak as to be completely powerless in the face of Iranian strikes.

The fact that it hasn't struck back against Iran so far, to the best of my knowledge, unless there's any reporting out there that the UAE has conducted strikes against Iran that I'm not particularly familiar with. I think it's more of a testament to the fact that they didn't want this war.

At the end of the day, this is a war that the U.S. and Israel began, despite a push from countries within the Gulf telling them, hey, we'd rather you pass your diplomacy because if you start this war, and pardon my French, shit will hit the fan for us.

As you rightfully said, Iran and the UAE, they're so close that Iran can basically do a lot more damage to the UAE than it could ever even dream of doing to the American homeland. So I think that simple fact that this is a war that the U.S. started, this is a war that the U.S. chose to pursue despite the advice of regional allies.

And, you know, we're not counting guys like Mohammed bin Salman, who was secretly pushing for the war. Despite the advice of regional allies, they chose to start this war, they should be able to, at the very least, protect their allies.

And at the very least, offer them a guarantee that if Iran strikes you in the middle of what should be a ceasefire, we will be there to defend you. We will be there to exert our might, our military might, to, you know, keep you guys safe and ensure we extract a cost from Iran to make them think twice before even attacking them, attacking you guys.

That is the most, for me at least, that is the best way to guarantee, and I'm not saying that America will lose allies over this, but it's the best way to guarantee your allies don't just, you know, say no to your wars off the bat because they know if shit hits the fan, no one will be there.

If, if you want allies to support your wars moving forward, you need to be able to defend them. You need to be able to deter anyone from attacking them. That's their minimum. That is the focus of this war, though. I mean, it's not that, to be clear, I'm not saying that, I'm not, I am not an isolationist here.

I am not saying that the U.S. interest only extends to its own domestic soil here. The broader interest of the United States is to ensure that Iran is not going to continue these attacks. The difference between the Emirati approach and the American approach is how you ensure that. To be absolutely clear, though, we are defending our allies because...

The interceptors that were shooting down these Iranian drones and missiles, those were American. We haven't abandoned them or anything. We're just not actively attacking Iran in response to it, which is a slightly different framing technically, but is a world of difference in terms of importance, to me at least.

We will be there to continue to defend the United Arab Emirates. So I have no qualms about that. But the big issue here to me is that the Emirati approach is that we have to start, or they would prefer to see at least a conventional bombing campaign start up again.

I just don't see how that's going to be in either the Emirati's interests, other than short-term retaliatory victory claims, or the American interests. I think both countries, long-term, if the United States is able to keep going down this economic fury route, would be more easily achieved and better achieved than it would be if we just start bombing again.

You know what I mean? Okay, counterpoint. Wouldn't it have been in both countries' best interests, the UAE and America, if no one started this war? Before this war began, there was no bombing campaign? No, hear me out. So for our dear listeners, you all can't see what's happening right now, but Kyle is shaking his head.

And he's disagreeing with my points entirely. And let me finish my point before you jump in, Kyle. Give me a second. Of course. If we're looking at the best interests of both the U.S. and the UAE, right, it would have started with Trump choosing to tear up the JCPOA. That was a really bad decision.

Almost comparable to, and I'm saying this specifically because it's top of mind, I recorded a podcast yesterday with a Mali expert talking about the crisis in Mali. It's the third episode of the Dear South podcast. Please give it a listen.

It's comparable to Trump's decision to tear up the JCPOA is comparable to the Malian Hunters' decision to tear up the Algeys Accord that had stopped the war, the war between the Tuaregs in the North and the Malian government.

So those same Tuaregs became the, what's it called, the Azawad Liberation Front that we saw teaming up with the Al-Qaeda-linked Jamal Nusrat Islam al-Muslim in Janim over the weekend of the 25th that have been launching. Thank you. coordinated attacks against the positions of the Malian government.

In the same light, with the JCPOA in place, Iran wasn't pursuing a nuclear bomb. I'm not saying the ambitions are not there, but it was not actively pursuing it. It was not enriching uranium. And this is according to the Institute of IEA, the atomic guys, the atomic energy guys who basically are doing the regulation. They were not enriching uranium.

They were not basically doing anything. The things that Trump is claiming he is protecting Americans and the broader Middle East from are a beast of his own creation. If he hadn't tripped up the JCPOA, we wouldn't be looking at an Iran with over 400 kilograms of nuclear fissile material that can be put on bombs or whatever.

And we wouldn't be in a situation where Iran is bombing the UAE if, on the 28th of February, instead of bombing Iran, the U.S. and Israel chose to do what the Omani foreign minister had been calling for and give diplomacy a chance. So this is going to be a very interesting conversation, for sure.

We have, I want to start going back to Trump's first term, because after withdrawing from the JCPOA, he did want a diplomatic route, which he continued to pursue moving up to this current campaign of Operation Epic Fury and Operation Economic Fury. This was bipartisan as well, by the way.

So Joe Biden, during his presidency, also attempted to resurrect the Iran nuclear deal. Each time, the Iranians kept pushing for more and more and more. So even up until the bombs started falling on February 28th, negotiations were underway.

And essentially, the Americans, after years of trying to get another deal in place, this ultimately said, this isn't working. And at some point, if after almost a decade now, what was it? He pulled out in 2018.

So if we're in 2026, and still no deal is ultimately being able to be reached, then you have to sort of question where all of this is ultimately going. And if there's this talk, especially in European circles, of just give diplomacy a chance.

But again, if this hasn't gotten anywhere in the last eight years, I don't see any realistic path that it's going to now. So that sort of leads to the logic that we're seeing today. But if we're going to invoke Emirati national interests, or Saudi national interests, or any GCC national interests. excluding Oman.

We cannot be doing so on the grounds of the JCPOA because every single one of them was vehemently opposed to it.

From the get-go, the only states in the Middle East that were very in favor of the JCPOA was Bashar al-Assad's Syria, of course Iran, and then Russia was particularly in favor of it as well because this was very seen, whatever our own personal thoughts on this aside may be.

The Gulf was considered to be code red in terms of giving a lot of money to Iran to build up specifically the conventional ballistic missiles that they have spent a month raining down across the entire region. Iran's missile program in 2015 when they signed this deal was a fraction of what it was when the United States launched Operation Epic Furity.

So in terms of standing with our Emirati allies, we sort of have to choose here. We can't be pro-JCPOA and pro-defending Emirati interests because those are directly in conflict.

I would argue that the opposition that the Gulf countries had to the JCPOA is primarily because they viewed it as an acceptance that Iran would continue to have influence on the region and short of a campaign that completely decimates, and you know, not to the degree that we've seen over this campaign, but one that completely removes the regime in Tehran to

The point where it's something new entirely, something completely different.

Iran will continue to have an influence in the region, and the JCPOA was the best of a bad solution, was the best in a really, really difficult case. We can argue otherwise, but the truth is, with a JCPOA in place, Iran didn't enrich its nuclear systems, didn't build out its nuclear arsenal as you know. Sorry, I'm getting a little tongue-tied.

I need to take some water. Basically, Iran didn't build nukes. It didn't pursue its nuclear program. Yes, it did pursue its missile program. But again, they viewed that from the Iranian point of view as a deterrent because, and I find myself arguing the Iranian point of view a lot on this podcast today.

Every country is regardless of what we feel about these countries, is regarded a right to defend itself, is regarded a right to have its own capabilities. In my conversation with the Iranian ambassador to Kenya, he specifically highlighted that Iranian missiles were purely defensive.

And I would argue that given that Iran hadn't directly attacked any of the GCC countries before the 20th of February, 2026, that is a genuine argument that can be made, that Iran was keeping them as a deterrent in case anyone struck first, they had the option of striking back. Sure.

So a lot of those are very valid points that I will respond to a few of them. So to get to the broader JCPOA, I mean, I definitely understand that most sides, at least, will concede that it wasn't perfect.

When you talk about especially the sun-setting clauses of this, even though the staunch defenders will sort of admit, Obama admitted himself, like, by the end of this deal, you get to a point where Iran has been given a decade, decade and a half of a relatively open window in which it can pursue some nuclear enrichment with sanctions relief, which, of

Course, they will use to pour money into their missile defense systems and ballistic missile programs, which are not defensive.

But all of this sort of gets to the broader issue at hand, which was the reliance on what I like to call, or what others call, the Washington Consensus at the time, which broadly, in my view, was just mistaken.

The thinking is, in this mindset, if you can get countries, like, addicted enough to markets, they will inevitably move towards liberalization, they'll de-escalate and seek to join the broader international community. This is like liberal internationalism taken to its maximalist conclusions, okay?

So, and you can see that it worked in some cases, especially in the 20th century, where countries that the United States used to have bad relationships with after reforming, I mean, Vietnam is sort of like the post-child of this.

The Vietnamese government is way more pro-U.S. and way closer with the U.S. now than would ever have been thought imaginable in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. But beyond those isolated cases that I would argue is more a natural result of something like the Chinese, the Chinese.

So, threat to Vietnam, just pushing them closer to Washington's sphere of orbit. I don't think that was ever realistic for Iran.

But more broadly, I think we have to recognize that nukes are sort of a secondary concern, at least from my perspective, because if we're talking about a situation in which Iran is using a nuclear weapon, the game's over at that point. We are so far down the line, whereas their ballistic missile program is not at all like that.

Now, I completely believe that the Iranian ambassador told you how defensive these are in nature. They're attacking Oman. I mean, this was not a defensive project. Oman's foreign minister was in Washington the day before the U.S. started bombing. And that's how we're trying to convince the administration not to attack Iran. And that's how they repaid them.

And now they're in a difficult situation because the Omanis are not getting on board with this Iranian plan to put tolls in the Strait of Hormuz in no small part because Iran was just attacking them. So this is not as nearly as clear cut to me, as I think some perspective may suggest.

A huge part of it to me is the proxies that Iran has built up throughout the Middle East, in particular in Lebanon, which we've talked extensively about. So I don't want to make too much of Lebanon.

But the case of Hezbollah just essentially hijacking the entire country and dragging it into war time and again for no other reason than on behalf of the Islamic Republic, this is not a defensive project. It may have some defensive capabilities and defensive purposes.

But in terms of hijacking the Lebanese state, that is way more than just defending Iran in case it's attacked. That's overtly subjugating other countries, which is why the Gulf was so opposed, specifically the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia was so opposed to the JCPOA.

So if we are going to talk about standing with our allies and especially that Mubarak quote, which I think is so interesting, where if the countries that wrap themselves in America end up naked, that same logic applies to the JCPOA.

Because after the deal was signed, there was a panic throughout a lot of the Gulf, because they recognized Iran would use the sanctions relief to build up the exact same missiles that were raining down on them earlier this year, and the same proxy forces that have held up the region for decades at this point.

So in terms of, like, if we're going to say we need, the United States needs to side with the Emiratis more, I mean... The logical conclusion of that is not pro-JCPOA, though. I will concede it was, it had its flaws. The sun-setting clause, the Washington consensus. Basically, everything I've said about it is true.

However, my final point would be to argue this, that Iran, and this goes back to a discussion you and I had on our very first time recording this podcast with Evan here, that Iran is a rational actor, and it would have never used those missiles it built up during the JCPOA years and the years immediately afterwards, if a threat from Washington and Israel

Hadn't appeared, if it was just, you know, approached through negotiations, that, in my view, that's what will have happened.

I want to take us away from, you know, the JCPOA and the broader question of the Washington consensus, and whether if you're listening to this and you're interested in hearing about how that kind of liberal worldview thinking influenced foreign policy to the degree where trade is now one of the most potent weapons of war, we have an entire 14-minute episode

Long-form piece that I wrote on our sister channel, Homefronts.

You should definitely check that out. And Kyle has a piece coming out on Homefronts next week about how evangelicals have basically influenced American policy. We do this because all of this is a content we put out that we are really, really proud of. So I want to talk about something that I have just seen literally right now.

This was shared by Ali Hashem, who is an Al Jazeera journalist who has covered the Middle East extensively. So Iran's newly created Persian Gulf Strait Authority has reportedly emailed shipping companies that have vessels stranded in the Gulf, laying out its instructions for passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

One, payment of the shipping tolls must be done in Iranian rials. Two, guarantees issued within the Iranian banking system. Three, countries that caused or contributed to damages during the war must pay reparations before obtaining a permit.

And countries that have sanctioned Iran or blocked its assets abroad are completely banned from using the Strait of Hormuz. Four, all documents must use the name the Persian Gulf. Five, non-compliance will result in this. seizure and a fine of 20% of the cargo's value.

Six, all vessels must follow designated corridors and comply with Iranian armed forces instructions. Seven, Israeli flagged vessels and any ship going to or from Israeli ports are banned from using the street of rumors. So, Kyle, I know I haven't given you much time to digest those requirements from Iran, but what do you think? I'm ready.

I think in particular, one of them is the most poison pill among them, being that they want countries to be paying it in Iranian rial. That's going to be extremely difficult. You can't just get rial. They had originally been planning on using cryptocurrency and Chinese renminbi to facilitate this.

The fact that they're trying to use rial is very interesting to me. I'll have to look a little bit more into that, but I don't even know how they would... If you're on a ship in the middle of nowhere, I mean, you may be able to do a currency exchange with them. I'm not sure, but that's going to be a very interesting dynamic to see how that plays out.

But more broadly, I just, I can't see, especially the point of Iran not allowing any country that has sanctioned or frozen Iranian assets through it all. I mean, that, to come back to the Emirati point, that is the United Arab Emirates, okay?

They have a huge amount of Iranian assets, and I don't think they've frozen them yet, but they've sort of held it as like a card and A's up their sleeve. I think they're sort of using it in case they think Washington has abandoned them too much. They would invoke that.

We'll have to see exactly where that goes, but that point right there is aimed specifically at the United States and the UAE. I can tell you the logic behind that was specifically those two countries. I don't see that going anywhere.

I see this being a real roadblock to any deal being formed because allowing Iran to put tolls in the Strait of Hormuz would allow it to bypass any future sanctions by way of just tolling an international waterway. And we discussed that earlier in the episode, but I can't see the United States or the Gulf either agreeing to this at all.

And you're not the only one who's said something similar. Yeah. Yeah, the... The... The... The... intelligence firm, Kepler, has basically put out a very similar assessment saying they don't really see this having much of an impact. America and Gulf countries won't stand for it. And this will basically be rejected by the shipping companies themselves.

So again, Iran finds itself putting tools that no one will pay. In the time since we recorded our very first podcast together, I went from being someone who believed these tools might work to seeing things your way, Kyle, and saying, yeah, I don't think they will work.

I don't think putting tools requires so much to go right that I don't think the environment itself allows for the imposition of tools. That will significantly benefit Iran. So yeah, on that way that relates. Cheers to that. I'll have to ask Evan what his assessment is on the toll front.

I have similarly changed my views throughout the campaign a bit, but I have maintained the toll position exclusively because of the international ramifications this would have.

That's a major you don't do this because if one person does it, then everybody and their uncle who lives next to a waterway with a ship passing through is going to set up a toll booth and say, hey, you got to pay me to get through. And I that's a global trade as we know, it just can't work that way.

So I mean, there's kind of Singapore, for example, was coming out against the Iran tolls in Hormuz. Why? Well, because of this shipping situation. That's why. So you I don't see that being agreed upon. And if the United States does agree on that is a massive concession. But I don't see it happening. I don't see it happening either.

Because again, it's a massive concession. And Trump's entire art of the deal is deal making is a zero sum game. And someone has to lose for Trump to win. Iran getting such a major concession would be them winning. And that means Trump loses, right? So I don't envision a situation where Trump allows Iran to claim such a major, major public victory.

So this is something I discussed with the head of the ACLED Armed Conflict Location Event Data Tracking Project, Cleaner Rally, during the second episode of the DealSelf podcast, the idea that no matter who eventually ends up being the winner of this. entire debacle, and, you know, we can debate who will end up being the winner, both sides will claim some

Sort of victory.

Both sides will claim they brought the other to their knees in some fashion or the other. And given that the Iranian people have limited access to information, they are being fed whatever the IRGC deems fit.

And in a similar light, I'm not saying, you know, Americans have as many restrictions to the information that they're getting, but whatever version of this war the Americans are getting is very heavily skewed in favor of America, in favor of portraying the American battles as perhaps more effective than they are being.

And this isn't to say that there aren't, there isn't adversarial coverage that is reflecting the war negatively, but still the broader point remains that everyone will claim to one degree or the other that they won, that they have won a bigger victory than they have.

So I, yeah, I definitely, without regime change, I completely agree that the only way out of this is going to be something that both sides can present as a victory, the issue being like, does that exist? Is there a way we can get like a, something that both sides agree? I am curious. So do you sit like, I don't, I don't rely too heavily on American media.

I do, I try to prioritize regional media above American because what a lot of times American media will do is filter down various different regional outputs and then present it in a flat way that doesn't sort of show you which side it's coming from. But do you see the American media as being particularly pro the Iran war?

Because for my general perception, it's been quite hostile, but I'm not, I'm not an expert on this. I wouldn't say pro the Iran war, rather, I will say very anti-Iran. And I want to make that distinction because it frames how you think of the coverage that the, you think of how the media is covering the Iran war itself.

So what I want to begin by saying is I am not in any way, shape or form a support of the Iranian regime, rather just someone who finds this entire war and geopolitics as a, as a very interesting field.

Let's start with looking at Iran, the Iranian protests that happened in late December and early January. there were thousands and thousands of people dead and that. has already colored the perception of how the Iranian regime will be covered in American media as a bloodthirsty, maniacal regime that was willing to kill thousands of its citizens to remain in

Power.

And that is an absolutely true framing. It is one of the most bloodthirsty regimes in the region. And with the hardliners in place, there's a line I use a lot when talking about the guys who are currently in power, especially Ali Baidi.

He was described by a regional expert as being so brutal, so cruel, that he makes the guys who were there before him look like school teachers. And for most of us who went to any kind of school, our teachers, no matter how bad we thought they were, they were nowhere near an IRGC commander, right? No matter how much we hated them.

But Iran is now ruled by someone who is so cruel, he makes the old guard look like school teachers, just to show you how, what's the right word for this? Just how cruel the Iranian government is now. So yes, I want to start by acknowledging that.

But at the same time, Iran is still, to its people, it might be one of the most brutal regimes, but on a grander geopolitical scale, it's still acting as a very rational actor.

So what I've seen in the news is the portrayal that simply because the Iranian regime did those horrible things to the Iranian people in early January and early December, it is an irrational actor. And that's a framing I've come to disagree with over time.

So I wouldn't say that the coverage is very pro this war, minus outlets like Axios, which have been accused of being tools for the Trump regime to manipulate the markets. And whether a credible accusation or not, I'm not passing judgment, but rather just an observation that the coverage of this war has been very interesting to see.

Well, so the rational actor stuff is less about how they handled the protests from a from a brutal regime's perspective, actually cracking down is sort of rational in terms of maintaining its security. The non-rational stuff, I wrote a piece for Fronts.co earlier this year. And even I did not estimate correctly how irrational Iran would. on some of this.

There is no rational world in which attacking Oman makes any degree of sense. There just isn't. Oman was the most pro-peace, pro-Iran country. They don't host U.S. bases. I don't. Yeah, they don't host U.S. bases. They were totally irrelevant to this in terms of any American support here.

Even, as I said earlier, their foreign minister was in Washington on February 28th trying to negotiate with the United States not to attack Iran, and they still get bombed. That's not a rational choice there. That's just a regime sort of launching on people and thinks it can hit.

But the bigger picture here for media, what I always try to do with my coverage in war fronts is I try to get different countries' perspectives. So when it comes to presenting the Emirati view, if you're looking for American or Israeli or other media, countries' media, they're not going to have nearly as much authority as like the Emiratis themselves.

So the national and several other outlets have very, very good coverage from their perspective. So that type of stuff can really help filter down. From the American perspective, though, I can't say that the Iranian regime has received nearly as much coverage that in the broader society, just speaking here as an American, their crackdown got attention.

But when you talk about something like Gaza, which received so much attention for so much time, I mean, I believe the death toll in Gaza was somewhere around 70,000 over since October 7th, 2023, the Iranian regime killed more than half that number in two days. Okay? That scale is shocking.

And I don't think it really, at least domestically here in the U.S., got nearly as much attention. So we can make of that what we will. But I do kind of want to pivot here because we are running a little short on time. Wilfred, I know you've been tracking developments out of Syria. What's been going on there?

I had a piece last week go up on Syria as well, so I have some thoughts. But you were tracking developments specifically regarding some Jordanian visitors, shall we say? Yes, I was tracking what was happening over the weekend with Jordan conducting airstrikes into Syria into what it claimed were drug production sites and drug trafficking sites. So the...

It's a drug crisis that has been happening in the Middle East, away from much of the world's attention, because when we think of a drug trafficking crisis or a drug crisis in general, we tend to think South America, right?

But in the Middle East, there has been a drug crisis that was very responsible for fueling the Assad regime, for providing it with finances. And over the weekend, Jordan struck several facilities that were allegedly used for drug trafficking. So at the moment, it doesn't seem like it escalated into anything beyond that initial run of strikes.

So it's just monitoring to see how the Syrian government will respond to that, how actively the Syrian government will respond to the drug trafficking that has been thriving within Syria's borders, and what other countries in the region will do.

And speaking of Syria, Kyle, let's talk about the region of Syria that was going through a major, there were fights going on in that region that you covered last week. Yeah, so the United States had a small military presence in the country that we withdrew a few weeks ago, I believe two weeks ago at this point.

But the framing Washington gave on this was, oh, it's no longer needed, Syria's making progress, you know, patting themselves on the back like, great job, guys, we did it, mission accomplished, if you will. But I am far more pessimistic on this than that reading.

Part of the reason we were actually withdrawing is because of concerns that Shara's forces are so infiltrated with al-Qaeda supporters and ISIS supporters that the U.S. forces were actually at risk in the country by staying there, which is hardly a ringing endorsement of stability in the country.

And there has been widespread reporting through various outlets that this is an ongoing issue. But it would be one thing if that was exclusively what's going on, but it isn't. There's so much sort of fracturing at the same time.

Just the other day, Syria foil, I'm reading this in the National, Syria foils Hezbollah assassination plot with raids across the country. So apparently Hezbollah was going to conduct, the Syrian government arrested 11 separate people who were planning on taking out senior government officials throughout different provinces in the country.

All of this was working in coordination with former Assad regime loyalists, Iran supporters in the country, and because they share a border with Lebanon, they were sort of able to go back and forth as needed. That's another front. Then there's the situation in Sueda, which is almost independent at this point. That's a Druze-majority province.

It's quite small, but it is nevertheless indicative of the sort of lack of control that the central government there has. Israel has intervened most recently, I believe last summer, to protect, as it frames, the Druze minority that was under attack from Shiraz government, which, again, a lot of this came down to sectarianism.

The Shiraz forces are heavily Sunni, and because of sectarian conflict with Druze, there was just an escalatory situation that resulted in some massacres going on. Israel stepped in and intervened, and as a result, an agreement was reached. Syrian forces would withdraw. But at this point, Sueda is looking pretty independent.

So the country is starting to seemingly come apart here a bit. The one good news for the country in terms of federal unity, if we will, the Kurdish forces were successfully integrated back into the country. So that was sort of the one argument against my thesis here that I did cover in my episode.

But I am just overall pretty pessimistic about the state of affairs there. I am not as well-versed on Sueda as you are, but it is a situation that I think is worth monitoring simply because of the Druze minority and because Israel has a similar Druze minority and has positioned itself as a protector of the Druze.

So from that specific angle, I just find it very interesting. For one final story before we hop off, there was a post on Twitter that has sparked a lot of conversation among the Iranian diaspora community, which I have been tracking because they tend to be a good source of what's the thinking like among Iranian people.

So this was from Pana Farhabadman, who's a video journalist, and I apologize, Pana, if I am mispronouncing your name. So Pana wrote yesterday, and again, today is the, just to give you a context in terms of the dates, today is the 6th of May.

Pana wrote yesterday that Reza Pavlavi, who is the son of the deposed Shah, is a US citizen and published supporting documents to prove it, which has left many, many in the Iranian diaspora feeling stunned.

For a lot of the Iranian diaspora, a lot of the Iranian opposition, he was rallying figure, a figure they could rally around, and an individual who was viewed as someone who could be an opposition government, or even just simply a transition government before, you know, in the eventual situation where Iran needed to transition away from the RGC and the

Islamic Republic.

So, Pahlavi has been proven to be an American citizen, but that isn't necessarily what is getting as much attention. What is getting attention is the oaths that he took. One, on his 20th birthday, which happened after the 1979 revolution that drove his family into exile, he declared himself Shah and took an oath as king.

And under Iran's lion and sun flag, he pledged to devote his life to Iran to defend its independence and sovereignty and protect the rights of Iranians and work for the national unity of the country.

Then, as an American citizen, he took the oath that anyone who is becoming an American citizen from being a citizen of another country takes, he took the oath that says something along the lines of, I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiances and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate state, or sovereignty.

The oath also says that the applicant will support and defend the U.S. constitution and laws, bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and if required by law, bear arms on behalf of the United States.

So with both oaths taken side by side, Reza is in a really difficult place, especially if this kind of information ever trickles down back to the Iranian people through the internet blockade that they're living through.

Here is a figure who had positioned himself as the guy, be leader of the Iranian opposition in exile, be key figure throughout all of this, who could lead an Iranian, potential Iranian opposition government, but with him having taken the American oath that directly requires him to renounce all his loyalties to his past government, how does that play out?

What do you, what do you make of this situation, Kyle? I just don't see it as particularly relevant, to be honest. People become U.S. citizens all the time. The oath of citizenship is not taken particularly seriously by many.

I mean, he will almost assuredly, if he returned to Iran, renounce any other citizenship, and this is sort of the end of that story to me. for me i disagree and you know this is informed by just the kind of vitriol i'm seeing towards reza because of this oh that i mean there's a ton of anti-palavi forces out there i'm not doubting that but i mean there were

Hundreds of thousands of people in just a few cities alone who are iranian diaspora who are who themselves had taken american citizenship i may add who are marching in favor of him i mean this is just i don't see that as the difference is none of these other people who've taken citizenship of whatever other country america included none of them are

Positioning themselves to be the next shah none of them are positioning themselves as you know the next great leader of iran once you the irgc and the islamic republic are removed from power he was fundamentally meant to be a key figure within the mythos of the iranian opposition and maybe it won't have an impact and you know the odds of him ever becoming

Shah are increasingly slim given just how dug in and entrenched the irgc have become but i think it's something worth considering especially just with how fractured the iranian opposition is right now whether you know this will dent his credibility any more than you know all the other scandals previously have i mean i think if somebody's still on board with

The palavi train at this point after his father i don't i just don't see this as tipping the scale for anyone i know many palavi palavists if you will in the diaspora who have been actively involved in protest i mean that i the idea that taking a citizenship is going to tip the scale there is just the palavi is very pro-israel he's pro-us he is he really is

And but that like that would be this would be this could be a scandal if that if that was not true so like if somebody would if he had been positioning himself as standing up to the united states sure that would be like legitimate criticism he's not he's he's that his dad himself he they're both overtly like yes we will normalize relationships with israel we

Will be much more friendly with the united states he's lived half of his or three quarters of his life abroad i mean this just isn't it's not the smoking gun i think you're making it out to be and i think on that point that's a wonderful point for us to end the podcast kyle i will let you have the final word my friend i just want to thank everybody for

Tuning in once again this has been the middle east round table i know last week i said that Evan Maloney would be back this week.

Depending on what's going on, we may have him back next week. We'll have to convene and hold an internal vote here as to whether we'll let him out of the straight. But until then, this is us signing off. Thank you very much for tuning in.